Preemptive and reactive spending in U.S. House races

Abstract

This paper examines the spending behavior of candidates for the U,S. House of Representatives. Particular attention is paid to the timing of receipts and expenditures over the complete 2-year election cycle. Incumbents raise and spend large amounts of money very early in the race, and this preemptive spending may have a groat impact on the selection of challengers and therefore on electoral outcomes. In addition, a model of reactive spending is tested for the general election period. Incumbents' expenditures are a function of the underlying partisan division in the district, the strength of the challenge, and candidates' feelings of vulnerability. Ineumbents are strategic actors who attempt to maximize their chances of reelection. Early in the term, they spend preemptively in an effort to influence the selection of their challengers. Later in the term, they spend in reaction to the strength of their challengers' campaign. The role of money in congressional campaigns is neither simple nor direct. More attention needs to be given to the strategic uses of money in the period leading up to the general election campaign as well as to the dynamics of receipts and expenditures over an entire election cycle.

War Chests as Precautionary Savings

“…Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baumgartner (1986), Goidel and Gross (1994), Hersch and McDougall (1994), Box-Steffensmeier (1996), and Hogan (2001) find support for the deterrence of war chests. 1 In contrast, Krasno and Green (1988), Squire (1991), Milyo (1998), Milyo and Groseclose (1999), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Goodliffe (2001), and Mycoff (2004) find either that war chests (or preemptive fund-raising or incumbent wealth) do not deter challengers or that the effects are so substantively small that deterrence is an implausible motivation.…”

Candidates, Money, and Voters-Assessing the State of Congressional Elections Research

“…The value of early money to incumbents is not clear. Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baumgartner (1986) found that House incumbents with large sums of cash on hand are able to deter potentially strong challengers from making the race. This finding was challenged, however, in House elections by Krasno and Green (1988), and in Senate elections by Squire (1991).…”

Testing the ‘Baobab Tree’ Hypothesis: The Cumul des Mandats as a Way of Obtaining More Political Resources and Limiting Electoral Competition

“…According to the extensive literature dealing with the informative signal of the money raised (e.g. Epstein and Zemsky, 1995) and with the strategic use of spending to deter challengers (Goldenberg et al, 1986), we can assume this amount may be viewed as a signal to potential candidates. The more money the incumbent candidate obtains, regardless of its source, the more he will discourage other candidacies.…”