Preference Changes in New Liberalism: The Impact of Changes of Government on US Trade Negotiations with South Korea and Colombia

Abstract

In classical two-level games, international cooperation is less likely when there is large programmatic distance and smaller domestic win-sets as a result of changing preferences. The US trade negotiations with South Korea and Colombia question this hypothesis and emphasize two empirical insights that can be integrated into the two-level game to improve its explanatory power. First, smaller win-sets due to preference changes can mitigate conflicts of distribution and make cooperation more likely if the negotiators are aware of the smaller win-sets. Second, when negotiators perceive the already achieved bargaining results as a new status quo, former positive sum games can transform into zero sum games, which makes cooperation more difficult, irrespective of the size of the win-sets. Negotiators who perceive conflicts as zero sum games will put more effort into avoiding losses and, as a result, domestic constraints cannot be used as bargaining levers vis-à-vis a foreign country.

Voting Free Trade Agreement Under Divided Government: The Case of Us - Colombia1

“…In 2009, during the Obama administration, Congress increased the programme's reach, seeking to reduce the impact of the economic crisis. The renewal and scope of the TAA was another point of contention between Democrats and Republicans; the former advocated continued review and expansion of the TAA, whereas the latter expressed strong opposition to the program or supported a different set of measures, criticizing the program for its low effectiveness and high costs (Hornbeck 2013). This impasse further delayed the submission of FTA treaties for House approval, and it was only in September 2011 that the extension of the TAA until 2013 was approved.…”

Persuading the Giant? Explaining Eastern Partnership States’ (Unexpected) Negotiation Success in Relations with the European Union

“…Small countries' negotiation success can be explored through a variety of theoretical lenses. One set of approaches draws attention to domestic level factors, such as changes of government, which can impact the outcome of negotiations (Janusch 2018). In the context of the three EaP countries, domestic-level factors do not fully account for the EU's willingness to offer concessions.…”