We thank Dr. Heo and colleagues for their comments, which deal briefly with our concerns about their own paper, but then go on to allege in some detail that our previous work is invalid. We deal with each of these areas in turn.Heo et al. describe us as having pointed out a 'limitation' of their assumption (A2). To be perfectly clear, we feel that this is much more serious than a mere limitation, but that (A2) fundamentally violates what is expected with randomisation, and hence that, in the context of a randomised trial, it is wrong. In this particular instance of randomisation, we expect equal preference distributions in the two treatment arms. In fact, assumption (A2) explicitly negates that requirement, leading to the unfortunate and bizarre consequences that we described earlier.Heo et al. have not responded directly to our criticism of (A2), but they now offer an alternative set of assumptions, apparently to avoid a restriction that certain conditional probabilities do not exceed unity. It is not clear why such a restriction, which should apply to any probability, might be needed. Furthermore, Heo et al. do not provide any modifications to their preference-based analysis that would be required by adopting these alternative assumptions.We now turn to Heo et al.'s remarks on our 2006 paper, 1 which we (Note: In the context of remarks here about the 2006 paper, 'we' should only be directly associated with the co-authors of that paper, i.e., Walter, Guyatt, Cook, and Prasad.) feel does provide a valid approach to the scenario that Heo et al. have considered. 2 In brief, Heo et al. have either not fully read our paper, or they have mis-understood it, leading to a number of false claims, as we now enumerate.First, Heo et al. describe the five preference groups in our Table 1 as 'exhaustive'. In fact, Heo et al. have failed to notice that our 2006 paper explicitly lists four other possible preference patterns: people who would refuse whichever treatment (A or B) is offered to them (so-called refusers); people who insist on A if offered B, or insist on B if offered A (defiers); and people who decline treatment if offered A, but insist on A if they are offered B, and vice versa (two groups of contrarians); see both the Methods and Discussion sections of our paper. 1 It is clear that these behaviour patterns are illogical and irrational, and they are unlikely to occur in practice. Accordingly, and following the approach of other authors in the areas, we restricted attention in our analysis to the more reasonable five preference groups in our Table 1. However, as we note in more detail below, if significant