Preference profiles determining the proposals in the Gale–Shapley algorithm for stable matching problems

Sukegawa, Noriyoshi; Yamamoto, Y.

doi:10.1007/s13160-012-0077-x

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Recently, computational problems related to manipulation of matching algorithms have been widely studied. In [4,5,6,7,8,9,10], the authors considered cheating strategies for the Gale-Shapley algorithm in the (classical) stable matching problem. Huang [11] considered a cheating strategy in the stable roommate problem.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

Kamiyama

2017

Operations Research Letters

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We consider strategic problems in college admissions with score-limits introduced by Biró and Kiselgof. We first consider the problem of deciding whether a given applicant can cheat the algorithm of Biró and Kiselgof so that this applicant is assigned to a more preferable college. We prove its polynomial-time solvability. In addition, we consider the situation in which all applicants strategically behave. We prove that a Nash equilibrium always exists, and we can find one in polynomial time.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

Kamiyama

2017

Operations Research Letters

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“…The computational complexity problem of computing a manipulation has already been studied in great depth for voting rules [see e.g., 5,4]. For one-to-one matching markets, Kobayashi and Matsui [10] and Sukegawa and Yamamoto [21] considered the complexity of computing beneficial manipulation for groups of agents. In general agents may be allowed to express some lesser preferred agents as unacceptable.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

Aziz,

Seedig,

von Wedel

2015

Preprint

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The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of manipulating DAA by agents such as colleges that have capacity more than one. For such agents, truncation is not an exhaustive strategy. We present efficient algorithms to compute a manipulation for the colleges when the colleges are proposing or being proposed to. We then conduct detailed experiments on the frequency of manipulable instances in order to get better insight into strategic aspects of two-sided matching markets. Our results bear somewhat negative news: assuming that agents have information other agents' preference, they not only often have an incentive to misreport but there exist efficient algorithms to find such a misreport.

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“…This process has been studied from different points of view. The Gale-Shapley algorithm (1962) for the assignment of students to universities is considered to be a basic reference, [7] and has been refined and adapted to different systems [17]. From another point of view, Murphy and McGarrity, [14], carried out a descriptive study on 350 North American colleges, highlighting the concept of college selection as a key factor for students, who consider the quality of the system and trust in the institution to be decisive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychometric study of a questionnaire for the assessment of factors associated with the choice of degrees and universities in the Spanish public system

Hervás

Olmos

Peró

et al. 2013

Proceedings of the First International Conference on Technological Ecosystem for Enhancing Multiculturality

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ACMHervás Jorge, A.; Guàrdia I Olmos, J.; Peró, M.; Soriano Jiménez, PP.; Capilla Lladró, R. (2013). Psychometric study of a questionnaire for the assessment of factors associated with the choice of degrees and universities in the Spanish public system. ACM. doi:10.1145/2536536.2536577.Psychometric study of a questionnaire for the assessment of factors associated with the choice of degrees and universities in the Spanish public system. ABSTRACTMany different factors are taken into account by students when choosing a degree and University. Some of these are general considerations, such as the quality of the degree course, ratio of available places and places in the degree course chosen as first choice, cut-off mark, etc. Others are subjective factors, such as friends studying the same degree or studying in the same university, etc. Knowledge of these factors and the importance given to them by students can provide a competitive advantage when carrying out activities aimed at advertising and attracting students. This paper presents a psychometric study of a questionnaire that has been developed to assess variables relating to social and personal aspects involved in the selection process and accessing the Spanish public university system. The questionnaire was evaluated by means of a pilot test, the results of which were used to generate a final scale, which was administered to a total of 1532 students from eight Spanish universities. These students can be divided into six major areas of training and courses from 2009-10 up to 2012-2013. All the students had recently graduated from high school and were in their first year at the university. The results showed that the reliability of the both the six factors taken into consideration (Consideration of the University; Perceived Utility; Social Impact; Vocational Aspects; Influence of Surroundings and Geographic Location) and an adjustment of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis used to estimate construct validity was high. Likewise, the results show high discrimination validity between groups defined by relevant variables such as gender or academic area of the university studies.

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Preference profiles determining the proposals in the Gale–Shapley algorithm for stable matching problems

Cited by 6 publications

References 8 publications

Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

Psychometric study of a questionnaire for the assessment of factors associated with the choice of degrees and universities in the Spanish public system

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