Preferences for redistribution: an empirical analysis over 33 countries

Abstract

International audiencePeople's preferences for state intervention in social policies vary. A cross-section analysis on individual-level survey data is conducted here over 33 democracies to highlight the link between the economic position of agents and their specific demand for redistribution. Controlling for a number of factors usually found to affect individual preferences in the literature, this article focuses on the role played by the occupational status of individuals in shaping their preferences. Individual labour market position, as well as family income, is shown to outweigh all other factors shaping preferences for redistribution. The odds of a manager to oppose redistributive policies are increased by 40%, as compared to those of an office clerk, for instance. Moreover, individuals' perception of personal mobility plays an important role: the odds of holding more positive attitudes towards redistribution are up by 32% for people who think they experienced a downward mobility within the last ten years. Evidence is also found for the fact that the political regime may have a long lasting effect on collective preferences: living in former-East Germany doubles the odds of holding positive attitudes towards redistribution, as compared to living in West Germany. Finally, the research presented here identifies which socio-political groups may be formed on the basis of their preferences for redistribution

Home ownership and support for government redistribution

“…We find that men, those with a higher income and more education, as well as the employed prefer less support for redistribution. We also find that those who belong to a religion are less in favour of redistribution, supporting the idea that religious institutions can be a substitute for the welfare state (Guillaud, 2013). Compared with the youngest age category (<26 years), older age groups are significantly more supportive of redistribution, and widowed respondents are less supportive compared with married respondents.…”

“…We focus on this particular dependent variable, as very few recent large-scale surveys contain good quality information on both tenure and welfare attitudes. Our dependent variable is based on a question that has been used in numerous studies on support for redistribution (Meier Jaeger, 2006;Kenworthy and McCall, 2008;Guillaud, 2013): 'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'. Respondents could indicate if they: disagree strongly; disagree; neither agree nor disagree; agree; or agree strongly.…”

Technological change, rent and income inequalities: A Schumpeterian approach

“…Moreover, as GDP per capita can be seen as measuring the stage of development, the latter may go hand in hand with the adoption of redistributive instruments. Nevertheless, the opposite outcome cannot be excluded, depending on the pro-egalitarian preferences of a society (Guillaud, 2013). Government spending is aimed at capturing the contribution of social policy to a reduction in income inequality.…”

The IncomeGini of Fairness

“…In the combined case, each camp's equation of motion is with the unique per case potential, where the two camps can interact, see Eqs. (10)- (14). Due to the boundary atc, the potential shapes change there, yet also in that case, there is a very visible di®erence between the two camps (perhaps even more relative to other cases), and therefore the sociological economic arguments (that are presented in this part) are still valid.…”