Prehistoric dangers and contemporary prejudices

Abstract

We review the logical principles that guide the application of evolutionary ideas to psychological problems, and show how these principles can be used to derive novel, testable hypotheses about contemporary prejudice processes. We summarise two recent lines of research employing this approach. One line of research examines prejudices resulting from perceived vulnerability to physical injury. The other examines prejudices resulting from perceived vulnerability to disease. Results from both lines of research support novel psychological hypotheses identifying variables-pertaining to both personality and to local context-that trigger specific prejudices against specific categories of people. We conclude by discussing more broadly some of the useful conceptual and practical implications of this evolutionary approach to prejudice.

Geographical Frame of Reference and Dangerous Intergroup Attitudes: A Double‐Minority Study in Sri Lanka

“…These results contribute to a body of research that identifies links between specific kinds of dangers and specific kinds of prejudicial beliefs (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002;Schaller et al, 2003). It is well known that the realistic dangers associated with intergroup conflict precipitate prejudice (e.g., Campbell, 1965;Jackson, 1993).…”

“…What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is that the perception of danger is highly subjective. Regardless of the real dangers posed by some outgroup, prejudicial responses to that outgroup are influenced by other variables that influence the extent to which individuals feel vulnerable to danger-and some of those variables (e.g., ambient darkness; Schaller et al, 2003) have nothing to do with intergroup conflict whatsoever. The results reported here implicate a link between perceived minority status and perceived vulnerability to the danger posed by an outgroup.…”

“…When individuals feel vulnerable, stereotypes linking outgroups to threat-relevant traits are especially likely to come to mind. In one study, for example, Canadians who chronically believed the world to be a dangerous place and who were temporarily in the dark (an environmental condition connoting vulnerability) were especially likely to perceive Iraqis to be hostile and untrustworthy (Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003). Thus, if indeed members of outnumbered groups feel more vulnerable to danger, they are also more likely to perceive outgroups as having malevolent intentions.…”

From Evolved Motives to Everyday Mentation: Evolution, Goals, and Cognition

“…For example, certain types of logical reasoning are facilitated under conditions in which the reasoning problem has content specific to the detection of cheaters on social contracts -who pose a particular type of social danger -and this effect occurs most strongly when individuals are in a context that connotes greater vulnerability to this danger (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;Cummins, 1998). As another example, when people are literally in the dark -an ecological circumstance that heuristically connotes a greater vulnerability to harm -they are especially likely to perceive ethnic outgroup members to be hostile and threatening (e.g., Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003;Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003).…”

Argumentation meets adapted cognition: Manipulation in media discourse on immigration

“…Yet, there is a significant literature in evolutionary psychology on the (mal)adaptive nature of discrimination and its cognitive underpinnings (e.g. Hirschfeld 1994;Sperber 1994;Schaller et al 2003;Schaller and Neuberg 2008). …”