Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account

Abstract

Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker's words from constituting evidence for the hearer's belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief.

Hermeneutical Injustice and Bisexuality: Toward New Conceptual Tools

“…The growing literature in "hinge epistemology," upon which I cannot expand here, shows how productively this notion can be employed for a variety of purposes, from the rebuttal of the skeptical challenge to the study of social phenomena such as testimonial justification, disagreement, or trust. 17 In social epistemology, I recently suggested that this notion helps to demonstrate how prejudice works in testimonial injustice (Boncompagni 2021a). I want to argue that it can also be applied to the study of hermeneutical injustice, especially in the context of identities.…”

Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement

“…5 5 These propositions are epistemic and ontological, but several philosophers have extended the notion of hinge commitments so that there can be moral, social or even political hinges. See (Ashton, 2019), (Boncompagni, 2021), (Coliva, 2015) and (Ranalli, 2022). …”

“… See Christensen & Lackey (2013) andFeldman & Warfield (2010).5 These propositions are epistemic and ontological, but several philosophers have extended the notion of hinge commitments so that there can be moral, social or even political hinges. See(Ashton, 2019),(Boncompagni, 2021),(Coliva, 2015) and(Ranalli, 2022).6 Albeit this leaves it open that one might have evidence for a hinge commitment (Neta, 2019). defends this view (Hazlett, 2006).…”