2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.05.004
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Present-biased preferences, self-awareness and shirking

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Cited by 44 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…A number of factors are relevant for the design of optimal compensation policy in the face of workers' self-control problems (see Gilpatric 2008;Kaur et al 2010;Jain 2012). First is the degree of workers' present-bias; the greater the present-bias, the sharper is the required trade-off between compensation and effort, and the more costly it is for firms to motivate workers.…”
Section: Optimal Incentive Contactsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…A number of factors are relevant for the design of optimal compensation policy in the face of workers' self-control problems (see Gilpatric 2008;Kaur et al 2010;Jain 2012). First is the degree of workers' present-bias; the greater the present-bias, the sharper is the required trade-off between compensation and effort, and the more costly it is for firms to motivate workers.…”
Section: Optimal Incentive Contactsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead, policy design must have in mind some notion of a representative agent while remaining cognizant of the diversity in individual preferences, and therefore behavior. In particular, the proportion of potential workers with time-consistent versus present-biased preferences will drive firms' optimal compensation policy (e.g., Gilpatric 2008), while the distribution of preferences among the unemployed shapes the design of optimal social assistance programs (e.g., Paserman 2008;Spinnewijn 2009). Resolving these issues is particularly challenging when workers' preferences are not easily observed.…”
Section: Labor Market Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The reason is that higher task costs make the agent more prone to procrastinate, and the principal needs to increase punishments to avoid inefficient procrastination. Gilpatric (2008) also focuses on a contracting problem with time-inconsistent agents assuming that profit is fully determined by the effort, so effort is effectively observable. However, the low effort level can be severely punished or not, and both cases are considered.…”
Section: Strategic Interactionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Workers' self-control issues have fundamental implications for the efficient design of compensation policies (Gilpatric 2008, Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan 2010, Jain 2012, Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan 2015. Ideally, public programs like the unemployment benefits system would also provide work incentives that address not only moral hazard, but also workers'…”
Section: Self-controlmentioning
confidence: 99%