Presentism and the Myth of Passage

Leininger, Lisa

doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1007463

Cited by 31 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…If there are uninstantiated thisnesses of past entities, then there must have been past entities. This undermines Leininger's (2015) argument that presentists aren't justified in appealing to presently existing surrogates (in order to establish some difference between successive moments). Thus, presentists have a way to resolve the incompatibility between the Present Thesis ('only the present exists') and the Change Thesis ('what's present changes'): the present moment can be compared to a proxy past moment, i.e.…”

Section: Thisness Presentism and Passagementioning

confidence: 87%

“…According to Leininger (2015), presentists cannot, since two central elements of presentism are incompatible. These two elements are: ''only the present exists: past and future moments don't exist'' (Present Thesis), and ''what's present changes: there's a difference in what exists from moment to moment'' (Change Thesis).…”

Section: The Problem Of Passagementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lisa Leininger (2015) argues presentists can't account for temporal passage because of an incompatibility between two claims: (i) only the present exists, and (ii) what's present changes. In particular, Leininger argues presentists aren't justified in positing presently existing surrogates of past entities to resolve the incompatibility, Footnote 23 continued objectionable connection between thisnesses and the past.…”

Section: Presentism and The 'Myth Of Passage'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These two elements are: ''only the present exists: past and future moments don't exist'' (Present Thesis), and ''what's present changes: there's a difference in what exists from moment to moment'' (Change Thesis). Leininger's (2015) argument has three steps. First, the passage of time-that what's future approaches the present, becoming less future, and that what's past recedes, becoming more past-requires temporal change.…”

Section: The Problem Of Passagementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Virtues of Thisness Presentism

Ingram

2016

Philos Stud

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Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can't express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don't exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent 'common sense' status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications. In this paper, I present and defend a version of presentism ('Thisness Presentism') that avoids the unacceptable implications. The basic strategy I employ is familiar-I postulate presently existing entities to serve as surrogates (or 'proxies') for non-present entities-but some of the details of my proposal are more novel, and their application to these problems is certainly novel. One overarching thesis of this paper is that Thisness Presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism since it solves important problems facing standard iterations of the view. And I assume that this is a good positive reason in favour of the underlying thisness ontology.

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Section: Thisness Presentism and Passagementioning

confidence: 87%

Section: The Problem Of Passagementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Presentism and The 'Myth Of Passage'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem Of Passagementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Virtues of Thisness Presentism

Ingram

2016

Philos Stud

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“…The problem with this claim, though, is that it is not clear how the presentist can give substance to the idea that 'the facts change' unless they also operate with a wider notion of 'reality', i.e., a reality also containing facts that do not figure in that description because they are not present facts. See also Leininger (2015) and Fine (2006) for related arguments.…”

Section: Experiential Presence Temporal Presence and The Metaphysicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Hoerl¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Philosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something's being present in perceptual experience (call this experiential presence) and that thing's being, or at least appearing to be, temporally present (call this temporal presence). Yet, there is relatively little existing work that goes beyond asserting such a connection and instead examines its specific nature. In this paper, I suggest that we can make progress on the latter by looking at two more specific debates that have hitherto been conducted largely in isolation from each other: one about the nature of conscious experience and one about the nature of time itself. The first concerns the extent to which the temporal properties of experience form an exception to the transparency of experience, meaning that introspection can provide support for one particular view of how experience itself is structured temporally; the second concerns the question as to whether there is something about experience that gives us grounds for thinking that the present is somehow metaphysically special. As I argue, the idea of a connection between experiential presence and temporal presence plays a key background role in each of these debates. Yet it can also, in each of them, be seen to draw one side towards making claims that are supposed to express an important truth but are at the same time, on the face of it, self-contradictory. In each case, resolving what it actually is that these claims are trying to get at turns on recognizing a distinctive feature of perceptual experience, which I refer to as its lack of temporal viewpointedness. Recognising this feature also helps in making sense of what the issues at stake actually are in the intuition of an intimate connection between experiential presence and temporal presence. P hilosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something's being present in perceptual experience and that thing's being (or at least appearing to be) temporally present. 1 Brian O'Shaughnessy (2000:1. It is a familiar point that, due to the finite speed of light and sound, there is in fact a time-lag before distal events impinge upon our senses, though in the context of ordinary interactions with

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Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses

Torrengo

2017

Erkenn

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As far as our experience goes, we live in a dynamic present. Those two phenomenal features of experience -presentness and dynamism -are obviously connected.However, how they are connected is not obvious at all. In this paper, I criticise the view according to which the former can explain the latter, which I call sophisticated representationalism. My criticism will be based on an ambiguity in the notion of tense found in the philosophical literature, that between the perspectival understanding and the dynamic understanding of tenses. The distinction is not just of independent interest, but it has a role in providing indirect evidence for the claim that the feeling of passage of time should be understood in non-representationalist terms.

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Presentism and the Myth of Passage

Cited by 31 publications

References 33 publications

The Virtues of Thisness Presentism

The Virtues of Thisness Presentism

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Perspectival Tenses and Dynamic Tenses

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