Presentism Remains

Tallant, Jonathan

doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9965-4

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…It is thus unsurprising that it has been criticised by both eternalists, such as Cameron (2016), and presentists, such as Tallant (2017). The aim of this paper is to point to a response to Deasy's argument that has so far gone unnoticed: in dismissing a plausible interpretation of 'is present' and claiming that it is compatible with eternalism, Deasy relies on a mistaken assumption about how eternalists should treat tense.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Presentism, eternalism and where things are located

Viebahn

2018

Synthese

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In several recent papers, Daniel Deasy has argued that the presentism-eternalism debate is unclear and should be abandoned. According to Deasy, there is no way of spelling out the predicate 'is present' that leads to a satisfactory definition of presentism: on some interpretations, presentism turns out to be compatible with eternalism, on others, it is clearly false or unacceptable for other reasons. The aim of this paper is to show that this line of argument should be resisted: if the predicate 'is present' is spelled out in terms of where things are located, the result is a definition of presentism that is neither compatible with eternalism nor clearly false.There is thus no need to abandon the debate between presentists and eternalists. This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form will be published in Synthese.2

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Presentism, eternalism and where things are located

Viebahn

2018

Synthese

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“…time and existence? One reason that we suppose the former can be illustrated by appealing to Tallant's (2019) brief description of his project in challenging Deasy's characterisation of presentism:…”

Section: The Varieties Of Presentismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Eternalism is characterised implicitly as a B-theoretic permanentism-the view that there is no absolute, objective present moment, and always, everything always exists (Cameron 2016: p. 111). Cameron (2016) and Tallant (2019) challenge Deasy's characterisation. We think that their challenges have the same shape; both object that the new debate does not capture what is at issue in the original debate.…”

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confidence: 99%

The rotten core of presentism

Tallant

Ingram

2020

Synthese

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Recently, some have attempted to reformulate debates in first-order metaphysics, particularly in the metaphysics of time and modality, for reasons due to Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013). In this paper, we focus on the ways in which the likes of Cameron, Correia and Rosenkranz, Deasy, Ingram, Tallant, Viebahn, inter alia, have initiated and responded to attempts to capture the core of presentism using a formal, logical machinery. We argue that such attempts are doomed to fail because there is no theoretical core to presentism. There is no single view or family of views that is presentism.

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“…2 It is impossible to 2 See e.g. Prior (1967Prior ( , 1968Prior ( , 2003; Tallant 2007Tallant , 2013Tallant , 2019Tallant and Ingram 2012;Smith 1993Smith , 2002Ludlow 1999Ludlow , 2013Bourne 2006;Tooley 1997Tooley , 1999Parsons 2002Parsons , 2003Deasy 2017; and Baron 2017 for a defense of various versions of A-theory. For arguments in favour of the B-theoretic outlook see e.g.…”

Section: Real Time and The Concept Of Timementioning

confidence: 99%

“…See e.g. Mozersky 2013Mozersky , 2015Price 2011;Prosser , 2013Prosser , 2016Torrengo 2017aTorrengo , 2017bTorrengo , 2018Skow 2015;Deasy 2017;Tallant 2019, to name a few participants in this lively debate. discuss a variety of means languages employ for temporal reference and assess their significance as evidence for the reductionist account.…”

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confidence: 99%

Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

Jaszczolt

2020

Philosophia

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Investigation into the reality of time can be pursued within the ontological domain or it can also span human thought and natural language. I propose to approach time by correlating three domains of inquiry: metaphysical time (M), the human concept of time (E), and temporal reference in natural language (L), entertaining the possibility of what I call a 'horizontal reduction' (L > E > M) and 'vertical reduction'. I present a view of temporality L/E as epistemic modality, drawing on evidence from the L domain and its correlates in the E and M domains. On this view, the human concept of time is a complex, 'molecular' concept and can be broken down into primitive concepts that are modal in nature, featuring as degrees of epistemic commitment to representations of states of affairs. I present evidence from tensed and tenseless languages (endorsing the L > E path) and point out its compatibility with the view of real time as metaphysical modality (endorsing the E > M path). Keywords Metaphysical time. Real time. Human concept of time. Time in language. Temporal reference. Reductionism. Modal reduction. Default Semantics. Tenseless languages Abbreviations time M Real time/metaphysical time time E Human concept of time time L Time in language 1 The Questions 'Yes, I love life. Why?' 'But you've made up your mind to shoot yourself.' Philosophia

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Presentism Remains

Abstract: Here I examine some recent attempts to provide a new way of thinking about the philosophy of time that question the central role of 'presentness' within

Cited by 6 publications

References 31 publications

Presentism, eternalism and where things are located

Presentism, eternalism and where things are located

The rotten core of presentism

Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics

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