Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America

Tsebelis, George; Alemán, Eduardo

doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0005

Cited by 77 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…After legislation is passed by the legislative and signed into law by the executive, the President implements the law via regulatory decrees, whereby detailed rules are attached to the more general provisions of the legislation (Sondrol 2005). On the other hand, decree power means that the Presidents are allowed to legislate, without Congress, by means of a different kind of executive mandates such as decree-laws and regulatory directives (Tsebelis and Aleman 2005).…”

Section: The Role Of Veto In the Changing Character Of The Central Plmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Changing Role of the Central Planning Offices in Latin America

Guinand

2015

Public Organiz Rev

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The central planning agencies in Latin America have undergone multiple transformations in their structural design. These agencies came to life during the late 1950s in response to a development strategy that required the state to provide long-run direction to development by means of economic planning. Five decades later, the same agencies were redeployed to perform an open-market development strategy. What explains the fact that the same agency, created with the purpose of planning economic development, has functioned across time and governments with sharp economic, and political differences? Following Mahoney and Thelen (2010), this paper highlights the idea that the basic properties of institutions provide some forceful elements that permit change. In this sense, the document shows how veto possibilities and compliance are key variables in understanding the changing role of the central planning offices in Latin America.

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Section: The Role Of Veto In the Changing Character Of The Central Plmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Changing Role of the Central Planning Offices in Latin America

Guinand

2015

Public Organiz Rev

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“…En el caso de Perú, diversos estudios han medido el poder del presidente peruano en su relación con el Congreso considerando sus prerrogativas constitucionales, entre ellas: el derecho de legislar por decreto (sin necesidad de solicitar autorización previa); introducir legislación exclusiva en materias específicas; y vetar las iniciativas que nazcan en el Parlamento (Mainwaring y Shugart, 1997;Shugart y Haggard, 2001;Tsebelis y Alemán, 2005;Payne, 2006). 3 Dichos trabajos concuerdan en que el presidente de Perú posee un poder importante, más allá de que su capacidad de veto sobre las leyes aprobadas en la legislatura se asuma débil o moderada.…”

Section: Latinoamericanos 43unclassified

El Congreso peruano: políticas públicas e influencia informal sobre la burocracia

Patriau

2014

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ResumenLas reglas establecidas en la Constitución peruana dotan al Ejecutivo de herramientas que le permiten participar activamente en tareas legislativas. Al mismo tiempo, el Congreso es valorado como uno de los menos preparados -técnica y profesionalmente-de América Latina, con una incidencia mínima en la elaboración de políticas. Este trabajo plantea, sin embargo, que dicho análisis no toma en cuenta que la legislatura peruana participa en el proceso de políticas utilizando canales informales de influencia sobre la burocracia. Estos mecanismos se identifican a través de 31 entrevistas a profundidad a informantes claves: legisladores, funcionarios del Ejecutivo, funcionarios públicos de carrera y expertos en administración pública. AbstractThe Peruvian Constitution grants presidents the power to participate in the policy making process. At the same time, the Peruvian Congress is considered to lack the technical and professional ability to fully participate in such a process. However, such analysis neglects the influence that the Congress can exert through informal politics. Based on 31 interviews with legislators, political authorities, officials and experts in public administration this paper shows that the Peruvian legislature participates in the policy making process albeit through informal channels of influence over the bureaucracy.Palabras clave: políticas públicas, instituciones informales, burocracia, Ejecutivo, Legislativo.

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“…Unlike U.S. presidents, many Latin American presidents have extensive formal agenda-setting powers and are central actors in assuring the approval of policy proposals in Congress (Shugart and Carey 1992;Limongi and Figueiredo 1999;Cox and Morgenstern 2001;Tsebelis and Aleman 2005). With the use of extraordinary legislative prerogatives and leadership in constructing majority coalitions in Congress, Latin American presidents advance their policy agendas (Power 1998;Figueiredo and Limongi 1999;Amorim Neto and Tafner 2002;Reich 2002;Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins 2003;Negretto 2004;Pereira et al 2005Pereira et al , 2008Almeida and Santos 2008;Pachón 2008;Palanza 2009).…”

Section: Hypothesis 3 (Bicameral Incongruence)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional and Partisan Sources of Legislative Conflict: The Brazilian Case

Hiroi¹,

Rennó²

2014

RIEL

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Abstract.We assess the effects of individual, partisan, and institutional dimensions of conflict on the duration and outcome of the legislative processes in the Brazilian Congress. Our analysis indicates that legislative approval is more likely when the size of the governing coalition is either relatively small or extremely large and least likely when the coalition size is barely over the supermajority threshold to approve constitutional amendments. In contrast, legislative rejection is less likely with either modestly sized coalitions or very large coalitions, but most likely when it is approximately the size of the supermajority threshold. We also find that the effects of certain institutional variables are time-variant. Bicameral incongruence initially has a positive effect on legislative approval but soon begins to yield negative effects, delaying bills' passage. On the other hand, with the passage of time, executive proposals are less likely to be approved or rejected, although their initial effects are the opposite. Finally, preference heterogeneity among Brazilian deputies, which should have a significant impact if lawmaking were contingent upon individualistic politicians and weak parties unable to deliver bloc votes, has mixed effects: it has no statistically discernible impact on legislative passage. However, it has a delaying effect on proposal rejection.

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Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America

Cited by 77 publications

References 7 publications

The Changing Role of the Central Planning Offices in Latin America

The Changing Role of the Central Planning Offices in Latin America

El Congreso peruano: políticas públicas e influencia informal sobre la burocracia

Institutional and Partisan Sources of Legislative Conflict: The Brazilian Case

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