Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust

Eisner,; Kenneth, J

doi:10.2307/2111519

Cited by 132 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The empirical evidence supports Peltzman's hypothesis, especially in regard to merger-related antitrust activity over national business cycles in the United States (see Posner, 1970;Yandle, 1988;and Eisner and Meier, 1990). Together with the political cost hypothesis, this evidence suggests that the incentives for earnings and accruals management associated with merger-related antitrust investigations may vary over business cycles.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 71%

Earnings Management and Antitrust Investigations: Political Costs Over Business Cycles

Makar

Alam

1998

Business Fin & Account

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This paper examines evidence of earnings management pertaining to regulatory-imposed wealth transfers (i.e., political costs) over business cycles. The sample consists of firms subject to merger-related antitrust investigation under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Industrial organization literature, together with the political cost hypothesis, suggests that these firms' earnings management incentives may vary over national business cycles. Our results indicate that investigated firms do indeed choose income-decreasing discretionary accruals during expansions but not during recessions, in order to reduce the political costs associated with Clayton Act cases. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 71%

Earnings Management and Antitrust Investigations: Political Costs Over Business Cycles

Makar

Alam

1998

Business Fin & Account

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“…Similar to the changes made to traditional models of political influence (Eisner & Meier, 1990;Meir & O'Toole, 2006;West, 2005), in which the bureaucracy was seen as a passive responder rather than an active participant, key stakeholders (vendors in this case) must likewise be studied as active participants in governing processes. Increasingly, scholarship in public administration focuses on contracting, public/private partnerships, and network governance.…”

Section: Discussion and Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Vendors Buy Influence? The Relationship Between Campaign Contributions and Government Contracts

Bromberg

2014

International Journal of Public Administration

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“…A vast literature considers both executive (e.g., Eisner and Meier 1990;Nathan 1983;Stehr 1997;Wood and Waterman 1991) and legislative (e.g., Aberbach 1990; Huber and Shipan 2002; Weingast and Moran 1983) influence on, or control of, agencies. The literature considers, as well, efforts to insulate agencies from this influence and control (e.g., Reenock and Gerber 2008;Wood and Bohte 2004).…”

Section: A New Force: the Extent Of Political Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Public Agency External Analysis Using a Modified “Five Forces” Framework

Vining

2011

International Public Management Journal

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Strategy matters in the public sector as well as in the private sector. Michael Porter's ''five competitive forces'' (5 Forces) framework (Porter 1979;1980; is widely used by private-sector firms to analyze the external environment and specific external forces. Can public agency managers use some version of 5 Forces analysis to effectively analyze the external environments of their programs? What modifications are required for public agency use? The case is made that a version of the 5 Forces framework can be useful when appropriately modified for public agency programs. The public agency version of the 5 Forces framework that is presented specifically considers public agency goals from three perspectives: descriptive, instrumental, and normative. The descriptive focus on autonomy is laid out. Another modification to the standard framework explicitly introduces political influence as an external force. Thus, the modified framework considers and integrates both political and economic external forces. Several significant modifications to Porter's other forces are also proposed and discussed. A number of strategic implications of public program 5 Forces analysis are discussed. The modified 5 Forces framework is illustrated both in terms of autonomy (descriptive level) and social efficiency (normative perspective).

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Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust

Cited by 132 publications

References 32 publications

Earnings Management and Antitrust Investigations: Political Costs Over Business Cycles

Earnings Management and Antitrust Investigations: Political Costs Over Business Cycles

Can Vendors Buy Influence? The Relationship Between Campaign Contributions and Government Contracts

Public Agency External Analysis Using a Modified “Five Forces” Framework

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