1994
DOI: 10.2307/2132151
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Presidential Legislative Priorities and Legislators' Voting Decisions: An Exploratory Analysis

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
23
0

Year Published

1997
1997
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
4
3
2

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 44 publications
(23 citation statements)
references
References 12 publications
0
23
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Presidents have continued to rely on speeches as they govern even as parties have centralized and unified in Congress (Aldrich and Rhode 2000) and evidence mounts that speeches have limited effects on public opinion (Edwards 2003). At times, speeches have increased presidential success in Congress (Barrett 2004;Canes-Wrone 2001a;Eshbaugh-Soha 2006;Fett 1994), with a modest impact over the national, domestic policy agenda (Edwards and Wood 1999). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Presidents have continued to rely on speeches as they govern even as parties have centralized and unified in Congress (Aldrich and Rhode 2000) and evidence mounts that speeches have limited effects on public opinion (Edwards 2003). At times, speeches have increased presidential success in Congress (Barrett 2004;Canes-Wrone 2001a;Eshbaugh-Soha 2006;Fett 1994), with a modest impact over the national, domestic policy agenda (Edwards and Wood 1999). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Subsequent works by Canes‐Wrone (2001, 2004, 2006) and Rottinghaus (2009, 2010) have shown that presidential efforts to manipulate public opinion can affect policy change, but only under certain specific conditions (see also Powell and Schloyer 2003); nevertheless, as politics in Washington have grown more polarized (see Bond and Fleisher 2000; Fleisher and Bond 2004; Theriault 2006, 2008), these moments have become increasingly elusive. Elsewhere, Eshbaugh‐Soha (2006, 2010) indicates that what is truly important in shaping legislative policy success is the president's usage of signaling as a way of making clear his priorities and preferences on passage and implementation (see also Fett 1994). Ultimately, these conclusions serve more as a complement to Edwards' overarching critique, rather than a refutation of it.…”
Section: An Evolving Understanding Of Presidential‐congressional Commmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a previous study, Eshbaugh‐Soha (2006) finds that when presidents deliver more verbose policy signals to legislators (and other actors) through speeches, they improve their policy‐making performance (see also Eshbaugh‐Soha 2008, 2010; Whitford and Yates 2003). Although it remains to be determined whether this improved performance is the result of Congress knowing more about the president's priorities (Fett 1994; Peterson 1990) or because the increased information on policy content reduces their uncertainty over substance, the pattern appears stable. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:…”
Section: Contending Explanations For Why Congress Listensmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, looking at the first year of the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan presidencies, Patrick Fett uncovers evidence that presidents who publicly identify their legislative priorities increase the likelihood of support from their “core partisan” supporters in Congress (1994, 507‐11). In their analyses of congressional policy making during the Eisenhower and Reagan eras, Mouw and MacKuen show that when presidents “go public,” they force legislative agenda setters to make strategic concessions in the content of legislative proposals in order to increase the likelihood of legislative passage (Mouw and MacKuen 1992a, 87‐105).…”
Section: Assessing the Bargaining Paradigmmentioning
confidence: 99%