Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin

Abstract

In liberal democracies, the approval ratings of political leaders have been shown to track citizens' perceptions of the state of the economy. By contrast, in illiberal democracies and competitive autocracies, leaders are often thought to boost their popularity by exploiting nationalism, exaggerating external threats, and manipulating the media. Using time-series data, I examine the determinants of presidential approval in Russia since 1991, a period in which leaders' ratings swung between extremes. I find that Yeltsin's and Putin's ratings were, in fact, closely linked to public perceptions of economic performance, which, in turn, reflected objective economic indicators. Although media manipulation, wars, terrorist attacks, and other events also mattered, Putin's unprecedented popularity and the decline in Yeltsin's are well explained by the contrasting economic circumstances over which each presided. I n liberal democracies, the approval ratings of political leaders play an important role in the interaction between citizens and their governments. 1 Like elections-but far more frequently-they communicate to officials what the public thinks of their performance. Moreover, the messages such polls send have been shown to make sense. In various Western democracies, leaders' ratings tend to rise and fall with the country's economic performance. Respondents appear to hold their leaders responsible and reward them for effective economic management with approval, much as, when voting retrospectively, they repay competent and honest incumbents with reelection.But what role do such ratings play in illiberal democracies and competitive autocracies, where formally democratic institutions coexist with authoritarian elements? In such states, public opinion is often viewed as more a product of political manipulation than an input into politics. Even when the polls themselves are trustworthy, they are thought likely to capture the effects of rulers' political theater rather than reasoned evaluations rooted in material reality. Citizens, fed distorted information by an unfree press and cynical about the possibilities for participation, are expected to focus on image and personalities rather Daniel Treisman is Professor of

Agreeable Authoritarians: Personality and Politics in Contemporary Russia

“…Adding controls confirms the view in the literature that voting for Putin is very closely tied to economics (Treisman 2011). People whose family economic situation had improved over the preceding year are more likely to approve of the president and people whose economic We find that agreeableness is significantly and negatively associated with contempt.…”

Agreeable Authoritarians: Personality and Politics in Contemporary Russia

“…Adding controls confirms the view in the literature that voting for Putin is very closely tied to economics (Treisman 2011). People whose family economic situation had improved over the preceding year are more likely to approve of the president and people whose economic fortunes have declined are less likely to approve.…”

Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014

“…Still, the federal constitution with strong presi-dential powers has been in place since 1994, yet from 1996-99 its executive was extremely weak and contested by other federal and regional political players (Hale, 2006, 211-216). Clearly, unlike his successor, Yeltsin did not utilise his considerable presidential powers to build a sufficiently strong patron-client network to personalise the regime, whether because of personal preference (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 82), or lack of financial resources (Treisman, 2011). The state of uncertainty before Yeltsin's departure even caused an elite split between the pro-Kremlin Unity party and an equally powerful faction around the Fatherland party headed by regional bosses Luzhkov, Shaymiev and former prime-minister Primakov (Golosov, 2011, 626).…”

“…Given the increase in oil and gas prices early in his tenure (see Treisman, 2011), President Putin's acquisition of control over Gazpromthe largest natural gas company in the world -meant that by May 2001 he and the state had access to a very large source of revenue independent from so-called oligarchs. 9 Following the demise of Yukos in 2003, Putin was able to control the energy sector through his deputy, Sechin, and other close associates (Kolesnikov, 2008;Rahr, 2008).…”