Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model

Shields, Todd; Huang, Chí

doi:10.1177/106591299504800305

Cited by 20 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We estimated probit models on all bills that reached a point where a presidential veto was a real option, with the dependent variable being a dummy for the bills that received a veto. Others have studied the incidence of vetoes issued every year using Poisson regression models (Shields and Huang 1995). We study, instead, the probability that every vetoable bill is vetoed by the president.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Belmar Soto,

Navia,

Osorio

2023

Lat Am Polit Soc

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Defined as a credible threat that strengthens the bargaining position of the executive, presidential vetoes, widely understudied, carry a stigma of confrontation between state powers. But under some institutional setups, partial vetoes can be an additional step in the executive–legislative bargaining process. After a discussion of whether partial vetoes are a proactive legislative tool or a bargaining tool to induce executive–legislative cooperation, we test four hypotheses using the 2,346 bills introduced in Chile between 1990 and 2018 that reached a vetoable stage. We identified 97 partial vetoes (4.2 percent) and one total veto. Presidents are more likely to veto bills with more complex legislative processes and when they have stronger support in at least one chamber, but more popular presidents do not veto more bills. As most presidential vetoes in Chile are partial, they are an additional executive–legislative bargaining step in the lawmaking process rather than evidence of hyperpresidentialism.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Belmar Soto,

Navia,

Osorio

2023

Lat Am Polit Soc

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Empirically based flight operations models can help in this regard; count models are particularly useful in the face of data limitations. Count models have been applied in many areas, including medicine, political science, ecology, agricultural science, and transportation engineering (8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38). In transportation, count models have been applied to estimate trip frequency, traffic collisions, and crash frequency (8)(9)(10)(11)(12)38).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Count Models to Represent the Impacts of Weather and Infrastructure on Flight Disruptions

Ohi

Kim

2020

Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation R

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores the application of count models to represent the relationship between flight disruptions and weather. Throughout the world, flights are regularly disrupted by delays at airports and in the terminal airspace, and less frequently by diversions and cancelations. Many delay studies have been conducted for large American and European airports, in part due to the availability of high-quality data. However, such high-quality data is not as readily available for other airports throughout the world. In this study, excess-zero count models are built using a publicly available dataset for Iqaluit Airport (YFB) in Northern Canada, to determine the influence of different weather components on disruption counts. Visibility and crosswind speeds are shown to have the largest influence on flight disruptions. The models are also applied using Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) flight data for Anchorage Airport (ANC) in Alaska; the data is systematically degraded to match completeness of the Iqaluit data to test the models. The results verify that an excess-zero model using incomplete data yields results similar to that of a count model with complete data, demonstrating that an excess-zero model can overcome data incompleteness to yield acceptable results. Although count models have been applied extensively in the transportation literature, the authors believe this to be the first application to flight disruptions, and the first quantitative model of operations at a northern Canadian airport. This paper demonstrates that challenges in data availability—the case for most airports throughout the world—can be addressed with novel statistical modeling applications, and thus, delay studies can be conducted for almost any airport.

show abstract

“…Vetoes of minor bills are not influenced by presidential resources, but they tend to increase in election years. Shields and Huang (1995) modify the Rohde and Simon and Woolley analysis by updating the analyses and employing an "event count" estimator. Instead of distinguishing between "major" and "minor" vetoes, Shields and Huang exclude pocket vetoes, contending that decision making on pocket vetoes is different.…”

Section: Aggregate Models Of the Vetomentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto

Gilmour¹

2002

The Journal of Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article evaluates and compares "president" and "presidency" centered explanations of presidential activity with respect to one important presidential power, the veto. Using individual bill data for nine congresses characterized by divided party government, I estimate a logistic regression model of presidential vetoes. This contrasts with previous research, which has used annual aggregate data. Using individual bill data allows controls for objectionable legislation passed by Congress and enables me to measure and compare the "propensity to veto" of different presidents. I conclude that presidential vetoes are in substantial measure caused by Congress passing objectionable bills, but that even controlling for congressional behavior, presidents exhibit strikingly different veto behavior. Ford was most prone to using the veto, and Reagan, the least. Although external factors exert great influence on the president's veto decision, the individual choices and strategies of presidents also have an important influence.A paradox of the American presidency is that this office, routinely called the most powerful on Earth, is also said by many observers to allow its incumbent relatively little autonomy. Neustadt (1960) asked whether the president was a "leader or clerk." Similarly, recent work has focused on "president" versus "presidency" centered explanations of presidential activity (Hager and Sullivan 1994;Shields and Huang 1997). Presidency-centered explanations suppose that the president is a clerk and that presidential behavior is a function of the institutional setting of the president. From this perspective, the individual attributes and idiosyncratic strategic choices of presidents have little influence, and presidents make the choices they do because of externally imposed constraints over which they have little control. The essence of the presidency-centered approach is the view "that most presidents would behave similarly in similar contexts" (Hager and Sullivan 1994, 1081). President-centered explanations suppose that the president makes choices that are not determined by outside factors and that individual attributes of the president will make a difference. According to the president-centered view, the president will have the freedom of action to im-

show abstract

Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model

Cited by 20 publications

References 12 publications

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Count Models to Represent the Impacts of Weather and Infrastructure on Flight Disruptions

Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About