Presidents, Responsiveness, and Competence: Revisiting the “Golden Age” at the Bureau of the Budget

Dickinson, Matthew; Rudalevige, Andrew

doi:10.1002/j.1538-165x.2004.tb00533.x

Cited by 31 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Even before Roosevelt, the Bureau of the Budget and later the president's own economic advisors within the Office of Management and Budget, designed and presented the presidential budget to Congress (Dickinson and Rudalevige 2004). That first-move agenda-setting power means that Congress, on the most important domestic issue each year, is responding to presidential demands (Gillies 2011).…”

Section: The Institutionalization Of the Presidencymentioning

confidence: 98%

Atypical Leadership: The Role of the Presidency and Refugee Protection, 1932‐1952

Orchard

Gillies

2015

Pres Stud Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Within international relations theorizing, political leaders are rarely cast as norm entrepreneurs or change agents. As heads of government, they have their own sources of legitimacy and authority, but also significant constraints. This article, based on new archival research, adds nuance to this model by exploring the leadership roles of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman on influencing global views on refugee protection. The role both presidents played at the international level was moderated by constraints at the domestic level within the congressional and executive branches. While both presidents demonstrated a strong commitment to refugees, only Truman was able to bring about change in U.S. policy by deploying the tools of norm entrepreneurship.Are elite decision makers, such as the president, norm entrepreneurs? Within international relations constructivist theorizing, norm entrepreneurs are seen as critical to the early stages of norm emergence, where norms are defined as shared understandings of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity that isolates a single strand of behavior (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 52; see also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). These entrepreneurs hold strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior Phil Orchard is a senior lecturer in international relations and peace and conflict studies at the University of Queensland and the research of the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. His research focuses on international efforts to provide institutional and legal protection to civilians and forced migrants. He

show abstract

Section: The Institutionalization Of the Presidencymentioning

confidence: 98%

Atypical Leadership: The Role of the Presidency and Refugee Protection, 1932‐1952

Orchard

Gillies

2015

Pres Stud Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…They may, in practice, rely more heavily on ideology than advice; yet, if it served them, they would certainly retain OMB's policy expertise. In fact, a growing body of work contends that the notion the two prioritiesresponsiveness and policy competence-represent an either/or proposition is both historically and theoretically flawed (Campbell 1986;Dickinson andRudalevige 2004a, 2004b;Wolf 1999). This work clarifies the role of neutral competence as a feature of organizational governance, norms imbued with professional values, rather than an objective quantity or condition (Aberbach and Rockman 1988a, 162-3).…”

Section: Reform As Problem Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why PART? The Institutional Politics of Presidential Budget Reform

Dull

2006

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The BoB, since its shift to the EOP in 1939, had quickly become indispensable to the president, serving as his chief staff resource for both creation of the executive budget and clearance of the wider executive branch's desired policy initiatives. Given the small size of the White House, the BoB served effectively as an extension of the president's personal staff, at the edges indistinguishable from it (Dickinson and Rudalevige 2004‐05).…”

Section: Exploring the Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, and Information Flow

Rudalevige

2005

Pres Stud Q

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article draws on various theories of organization and hierarchy to argue that presidential staff may be conceived as a necessary limiting structure on an otherwise chaotic informational environment. As such, the shape of that structure shapes the kind, caliber, and amount of information presidents receive on policy matters. Melding classic organization theory and recent formal work with earlier hypotheses about staff effectiveness, I argue that informational institutions centered on functional rather than specific policy lines will best serve the president, and that parallel processing and other monitoring mechanisms will also help the president obtain good advice. Evidence from the Truman, Reagan, and Bush II administrations is used to illustrate this theory and sketch a more systematic research agenda.

show abstract

Presidents, Responsiveness, and Competence: Revisiting the “Golden Age” at the Bureau of the Budget

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Atypical Leadership: The Role of the Presidency and Refugee Protection, 1932‐1952

Atypical Leadership: The Role of the Presidency and Refugee Protection, 1932‐1952

Why PART? The Institutional Politics of Presidential Budget Reform

The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, and Information Flow

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About