Presumption as a Modal Qualifier: Presumption, Inference, and Managing Epistemic Risk

The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions (guiding decisions vs. acquiring information), and promote different kinds of goals (non-epistemic vs. epistemic). Accordingly, there are "practical" and "cognitive" presumptions. In this paper, I show that the differences between practical and cognitive presumptions go far beyond contextual considerations. The central aim is to explore Nicholas Rescher's contention that both types of presumptions have a closely analogous pragmatic function, i.e., that practical and cognitive presumptions are made to avoid greater harm in circumstances of epistemic uncertainty. By comparing schemes of practical and cognitive reasoning, I show that Rescher's contention requires qualifications. Moreover, not only do practical and cognitive presumptions have distinct pragmatic functions, but they also perform different dialogical functions (enabling progress vs. preventing regress) and, in some circumstances, cannot be defeated by the same kinds of evidence. Hence, I conclude that the two classes of presumptions merit distinct treatment in argumentation theory.

Section: Practical Presumptions: the Standard Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

Bodlović

2020

“…The legal example of such rule is "If somebody is accused, then presume that she is innocent until proved guilty." Others define the presumption as (2) output of a presumptive rule, a conclusion p or, more precisely, a distinctive modal status of proposition p ("[Presumably,] Smith is innocent") (e.g., Hansen 2003;Walton 2008bWalton , 2014Godden 2017). 11 Thus defined, a presumption does not allocate the burden of proof (in a strict sense) but rather signals its asymmetrical allocation for the proposition at hand.…”

Section: Foundations Of Initial Presumptions: Inferential Reconstructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Before proceeding any further, it should be stressed the practical version of TAI is indeed similar to (paradigmatic) practical presumptions. According to Ullmann-Margalit (1983), Godden (2017) and, occasionally, Walton (2008bWalton ( , 2014, presumptions are non-epistemic means used in deliberation. The proponent is not obliged to prove p (while the opponent is obliged to prove the contrary) when there is a pressure to make a decision, this decision depends on whether p is true, p is uncertain but proceeding on p is (more) practically justified (than proceeding on ~ p).…”

Section: The Argument From Ignorance: the Standard Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, some presumption p can be dialectically privileged because the proponent is obliged neither to provide nor to have sufficient evidence for p. 7 The interlocutors are not aware of sufficient evidence for p, but the proponent nevertheless presumes p for the sake of making progress in deliberation. For instance, Ullmann-Margalit (1983) and Godden (2017) construct presumptions as claims that are held acceptable for non-epistemic reasons in the context of evidential uncertainty and deliberation pressure. In their view, if the evidence does not sufficiently discriminate between p and ~ p, our decision depends on whether p is true, there is a pressure to make a decision, and proceeding on p is more practically justified than proceeding on ~ p (e.g., it promotes social safety), then we may presume p and act upon it until the (imagined) opponent provides a sufficiently strong defeater.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

Bodlović

2019

By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance.

Presuppositional Fallacies

Macagno

2023

Presuppositions are at the same time a crucial and almost neglected dimension of arguments and fallacies. Arguments involve different types of presuppositions, which can be used for manipulative purposes in distinct ways. However, what are presuppositions? What is their dialectical function? Why and how can they be dangerous? This paper intends to address these questions by developing the pragmatic approaches to presupposition from a dialectical perspective. The use of presuppositions will be analyzed in terms of presumptive conclusions concerning the interlocutor’s acceptance of a proposition, which can be assessed as reasonable or unacceptable. Their dialectical function is described in terms of dark side commitments attributed to a collective "voice" representing what is commonly shared. For this reason, they count as attempts to include the presupposed contents into the hearer’s commitment store, which in some circumstances can reverse the burden of proof. The different manipulative strategies grounded on controversial presuppositions will be examined by showing the distinct roles that the latter play and the relationship between the degrees of presuppositional implicitness and the speaker’s burden of retraction.