Preventing Competition because of Solidarity: Rhetoric and Reality of Airport Investments in Spain

Bel, Germà; Fageda, Xavier

doi:10.2139/ssrn.849167

Cited by 9 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Furthermore, any financial losses are compensated through a cross-subsidy system. Here, Bel and Fageda (2009) show that the cross-subsidy system is not necessarily driven by a criterion of solidarity as it is usually claimed. On the contrary, a significant positive correlation can be found between investments and GDP per capita, leading to a larger allocation of the resources raised by profitable airports to the richest territories.…”

Section: Institut De Recerca En Economia Aplicada Regional I Públicasupporting

confidence: 56%

When supply travels far beyond demand: Causes of oversupply in Spain's transport infrastructure

2015

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Section: Institut De Recerca En Economia Aplicada Regional I Públicasupporting

confidence: 56%

When supply travels far beyond demand: Causes of oversupply in Spain's transport infrastructure

2015

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“…More recently, Bel and Fageda (2009) find that regional investment in airports in Spain is positively related to the electoral support to the incumbent party in the national government, and it is positively related as well to the party alignment between the national government and the regional government (that is to say, both of them belong to the same political party).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The economic literature has given increasing attention to the analysis of the factors that explain the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure (Yamano and Ohkawara, 2000;de la Fuente, 2005;Stephan, 2002 and2010;Knight, 2004;Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005;Bel and Fageda, 2009;Solé-Ollé, 2010). Research in this field has heavily focused in the dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, to explain the territorial allocation of investments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is it Redistribution or Centralization? On the Determinants of Government Investment in Infrastructure

2010

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Abstract:The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization intended to introduce or reinforce hierarchization in the political system has not been object as of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. In this way, we find evidence that network mode's (roads and railways) investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions.

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“…Big infrastructures, as airports and ports, are also locally managed and funded in many countries (see, e.g. Bel and Fageda, 2009). The central government retains the responsibility over utility infrastructures, as telecommunications and power, but even in this case technological improvements are facilitating the transfer of responsibilities to sub-national governments 1 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

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Solé‐Ollé

Stephan

et al. 2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990-2009. The results are interpreted in light of the predictions of the theory on fiscal federalism. We find that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue decentralization and not investment in redistribution. However, the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked grants to fund infrastructure investment.JEL Codes: H54, H77, H76, C23

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Preventing Competition because of Solidarity: Rhetoric and Reality of Airport Investments in Spain

Cited by 9 publications

References 16 publications

When supply travels far beyond demand: Causes of oversupply in Spain's transport infrastructure

When supply travels far beyond demand: Causes of oversupply in Spain's transport infrastructure

Is it Redistribution or Centralization? On the Determinants of Government Investment in Infrastructure

Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

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