Preventing Plunder: Military Technology, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Growth

Hendrickson, Joshua R.; Salter, Alexander William; Albrecht, Brian C.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3025548

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 48 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Economic justifications for redistribution are rooted in one of several alternative (although not mutually exclusive) rationales: (1) other-regarding preferences and neighborhood effects (Friedman, 1962;Hochman & Rogers, 1969;Tullock, 1983a), (2) externalities in production (Marglin 1963;Thompson, 1974;Hendrickson et al, 2018;Petach & Tavani, 2019), and (3) constitutional considerations (Buchanan, 1976;Buchanan & Tullock, 1962;Wessels, 1993). 2 Beginning with Hochman and Rogers (1969), several scholars contend that "Pareto optimal redistribution" is consistent with other-regarding preferences.…”

Section: Normative Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even if preferences are purely self-regarding, some redistributive taxation may be optimal if production generates externalities. Thompson (1974) and Hendrickson et al (2018) argue that if wealth accumulation imposes costs on the public-e.g., in the form of required outlays on national defense-some optimal interior level of capital or wealth taxation exists. Similarly, in a series of studies, Tavani (2019, 2022) 3 show that if production is characterized by strategic complementarities, an optimal tax and transfer scheme exists that both reduces inequality and increases the level of economic activity relative to their equilibrium values.…”

Section: Normative Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Tullock Index for assessing the effectiveness of redistribution

Petach

2022

Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I propose two alternative versions of a "Tullock Index" for assessing the effectiveness of income or wealth redistribution. In the spirit of Atkinson's (J Econ Theory 2:244-263, 1970) inequality index, the Tullock Index is constructed with reference to either (A) the maximum inequality reduction attainable with current transfer spending or (B) the minimum transfer spending necessary to achieve current post-transfer inequality. Using Current Population Survey (CPS) microdata from 1988 to 2014, I construct annual estimates of the Tullock Index at the national level for the United States. The Tullock Index is increasing over that period, suggesting that redistribution has become less effective in reducing inequality. State-level panel fixed-effects estimates show that ineffective redistribution is related to higher state-level poverty rates, lower employment-to-population ratios, and lower levels of overall employment.

show abstract

Section: Normative Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Normative Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Tullock Index for assessing the effectiveness of redistribution

Petach

2022

Public Choice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…If a prince's neighbors are all building ‘fiscal-military’ states, that prince cannot help but follow along, so long as he wishes to remain independent (cf. Geloso and Salter, 2020; Hendrickson et al ., 2018).…”

Section: German Cameralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Hendrickson et al . (2018) point out the existence of negative political externalities associated with increasing social wealth.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The fundamental Coase of development: property rights foundations of the effective state

Piano

Salter

2020

Journal of Institutional Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper identifies political property rights and jurisdictional rivalry as two important mechanisms that drive political and economic development. After developing a general framework to explain relative performance in the ‘market for governance’, we argue that Western Europe during the High Middle Ages presented initial conditions conducive to the development of effective states. We extend the framework by analyzing city-state governance in Renaissance Italy, as well as public finance practices in early modern Germany. We conclude by discussing the implications of our argument for the literature on state capacity and economic development. The takeaway is that well-aligned political property rights and competition in the provision of governance services can promote the protective and productive state while forestalling the predatory state.

show abstract

“…The medieval castle was a self-contained fortification with advantages over large attacking forces but could not deter attacks against a region, which was more readily accomplished by a centralized, bureaucratic military organization. Centralized military organization is necessary once society establishes wealth-maximizing institutions, which, if effective, increase the incentives for plunder (Hendrickson et al , 2018). Early societies may limit capital accumulation for self-protection, but as societies develop, they are expected to finance defense through taxation and borrowing (Thompson, 1974, 1979).…”

Section: Economic Theories Of the Statementioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of land property rights

Cai

Murtazashvili

2019

Journal of Institutional Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Legal reforms that improve the security of private property rights to land have characteristics of a public good with dispersed benefits. However, nothing ensures that the state will provide property protection as a public good. Some states provide property protection selectively to powerful groups. Others are unable to provide property protection. In this paper, we argue that whether the state provides property protection as a public good, selectively, or cannot establish private property rights depends on the following features of politics: political stability, government capacity to administer and enforce private property rights, constraints on political decision-makers, and the inclusivity of political and legal institutions. We illustrate the theory using evidence from reforms that increased opportunities to privately own land in the US from the late eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, selective enforcement of land property rights in China, and the absence of credible legal rights to land in Afghanistan.

show abstract

Preventing Plunder: Military Technology, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Growth

Cited by 4 publications

References 48 publications

A Tullock Index for assessing the effectiveness of redistribution

A Tullock Index for assessing the effectiveness of redistribution

The fundamental Coase of development: property rights foundations of the effective state

The politics of land property rights

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About