2022
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.13134
|View full text |Cite
Preprint
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Preventing Timing Side-Channels via Security-Aware Just-In-Time Compilation

Abstract: Recent work has shown that Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation can introduce timing side-channels to constant-time programs, which would otherwise be a principled and effective means to counter timing attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to eliminate JIT-induced leaks from these programs. Specifically, we present an operational semantics and a formal definition of constant-time programs under JIT compilation, laying the foundation for reasoning about programs with JIT compilation. We then propose to … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

0
0
0

Publication Types

Select...

Relationship

0
0

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 0 publications
references
References 36 publications
0
0
0
Order By: Relevance

No citations

Set email alert for when this publication receives citations?