2008
DOI: 10.17487/rfc5358
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Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks

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Cited by 21 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Applications MAY specify a shorter limit to prevent spoofed amplification and reflection attacks [RFC5358].…”
Section: Responder Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Applications MAY specify a shorter limit to prevent spoofed amplification and reflection attacks [RFC5358].…”
Section: Responder Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the case of UDP traffic, this will help protect against reflector attacks [RFC5358] and in the case of TCP traffic it will prevent an unknown client from exhausting the server's limits on the number of concurrent connections.…”
Section: Bellis Standards Track [Page 5]mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Disabling recursion prevents an authoritative name server from sending queries on behalf of other name servers and building up a cache using responses. Disabling this function eliminates the cache poisoning threat on authoritative serves and prevents their use as reflectors for DDoS attacks [BCP140]. In BIND, recursion is disabled by using the options statement in the BIND configuration file as follows:…”
Section: Dedicated Name Server Instance For Each Functionmentioning
confidence: 99%