Prevention of resource trading fraud in manufacturing grid: a signalling games approach

Abstract

In the manufacturing grid resource market, the information asymmetry for buyers and sellers is a common situation. With resource information superiority, some resource service providers (RSPs, sellers) often make the pooling equilibrium, so that resource service demanders (RSDs, buyers) cannot recognise high-quality resources owing to imperfect information. Hence, the authors propose a signalling games approach to prevent resource trading fraud in the manufacturing grid. In support of the architecture of resource negotiation and trading, RSDs can get more accurate information about resource quality based on the collateral currency promised by RSPs. In this way, RSDs can more accurately identify resource quality. This method focuses on preventing low-quality RSPs from sending out an incorrect signal suggesting high resource quality to entice RSDs to purchase the low-quality resource.Simulation results indicate that the game theoretical model has a reasonable and perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium, from which RSPs do not initiatively deviate.