Price and quantity competition in an asymmetric duopoly with licensing

Niu, Shuai

doi:10.1111/jpet.12332

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Assume that firm 1 engage in CSR activities. In other words, not only firm 1 concerns its profit, but it also concerns its consumers and the damage it causes to the environment (Goering, 2012(Goering, , 2014Fanti & Buccella, 2017, 2018Ouchida, 2019;Fukuda & Ouchida, 2020). Hence, firm 1's objective function can be described as:…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the related streams concentrates on different approaches to the licensing of technology. A variety of market structures, competitive models, and information structure models have all been used to study technology licensing approaches by scholars (Wang & Yang, 1999;Wang, 2002;Sen, 2005;Sen & Tauman, 2007;Sen & Bhattacharya, 2017;Niu, 2018;Jeon, 2019;Hattori & Tanaka, 2018, 2021. Other factors that influence the optimal licensing contract include product differentiation (Li & Wang, 2010;Ye & Mukhopadhyay, 2013;Rau et al, 2019;Zou & Chen, 2020;Sen et al, 2021;San Martín & Saracho, 2021), the number of participants (Antelo & Sampayo, 2017), and network effects (Zhao et al, 2014;Zhang et al, 2018).…”

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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This study investigates the green technology licensing strategies of firms with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly market. The results show that in the absence of CSR, the optimal licensing contract is fixed-fee licensing for a patent holding firm. In the precent of CSR, the optimal licensing contract for a patent holding firm switches from fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing with increasing level of CSR if the reduction cost of emissions is high. Moreover, we show that the profit goal of firm and the social welfare goal of government are not always mutually exclusive. If the level of CSR is low, a uniform licensing contract would be preferable. If the level of CSR is high, the optimal licensing contract is inconsistent. Finally, we show that CSR is not always beneficial to the social welfare while CSR benefits the environment. Social welfare benefits from increased CSR degree, but vice versa is true when CSR degree decreases. This research may provide valuable insights into licensing and CSR literature.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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“…Niu (2019) discusses whether an inside innovator will prefer an exclusive or non-exclusive licensing to the competitor. Mukherjee (2010b) and Niu (2018) show the relative dominance of quantity and price setting strategies in the presence of licensing. Wang et al (2020) consider licensing in a mixed oligopoly.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier

Kao,

Mukherjee

2024

J Public Economic Theory

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It is well known that if the final goods producers adopt new technologies, the input suppliers with market power can extract more rent from the final goods producers by increasing the input prices. Higher rent extraction by the input supplier neither allows the licenser of the new technology to earn large profit nor helps welfare to increase much. In a model with an outside innovator (the licenser), a final good producer (the licensee) and an input supplier, we offer a new perspective to the literature by considering a licensing option, which is often observed in the business world, but ignored in the literature. We show that the licensing option offered by the outside innovator can prevent rent extraction by the input supplier. The innovator's profit and social welfare are higher under licensing option compared to a standard licensing contract with no option.

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“…Moreover, Cournot competition leads to lower prices, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare than Bertrand competition.' ' Niu (2018) studies the relative dominance of price and quantity-setting strategies in an asymmetric duopoly with a two-part tariff licensing. The two firms simultaneously and irrevocably choose between price and quantitysetting strategies and later in the second stage, being aware of the market competition mode, the licensing offer is made.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology licensing under product differentiation

Sen

Kaul

Biswas

2021

J Econ

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This paper discusses the licensing of technology between rival firms in a Cournot duopoly with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The firms produce products of different qualities (high and low) and incur different costs per unit of output produced. It is shown that technology is transferred from the firm that produces the higher quality product to the firm that produces the lower quality product via a fixed-fee if the quality difference (net of cost) and the horizontal differentiation between the two products are relatively low. Technology is transferred through royalty, for any level of quality difference (net of cost), if the horizontal differentiation between the products is relatively low. A similar result is observed for twopart tariff licensing and quota licensing, which is a combination of output quota set by the licensor coupled with a fixed-fee. It is also shown that the optimal form of contract is either two-part tariff licensing or quota licensing. Technology is never licensed from the firm that produces a lower quality product to its rival that produces a higher quality product. However, the cross-licensing of technology is sometimes possible. After licensing welfare always increases.

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Price and quantity competition in an asymmetric duopoly with licensing

Cited by 9 publications

References 53 publications

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier

Technology licensing under product differentiation

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