2013
DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2013.823929
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Price collusion or competition in US higher education

Abstract: How geographical neighboring competitors influence the strategic price behaviors of universities is still unclear because previous studies assume spatial independence between universities. Using data from the National Center for Education Statistics college navigator dataset, this study shows that the price of one university is spatially autocorrelated to its neighboring competitors and such neighborhood structure induces cooperation Nash equilibrium in a spatial price game. In the spatial price game of univer… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…We are keeping the quintiles fixed, meaning the data are pooled over space and time and the quintiles calculated for the pooled data. We estimate conditioned transition probability 3 The relationship between convergence speed and spatial neighborhood structure has been verified by previous studies (Gu 2012a(Gu , 2013. 4 It is emphasized that the regional effect is positive by some policy scholars such as Berry and Berry (1990), Mooney and Lee (1995) and Ghosh(2010).…”
Section: Neighborhood Structure and Policy Diffusionmentioning
confidence: 97%
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“…We are keeping the quintiles fixed, meaning the data are pooled over space and time and the quintiles calculated for the pooled data. We estimate conditioned transition probability 3 The relationship between convergence speed and spatial neighborhood structure has been verified by previous studies (Gu 2012a(Gu , 2013. 4 It is emphasized that the regional effect is positive by some policy scholars such as Berry and Berry (1990), Mooney and Lee (1995) and Ghosh(2010).…”
Section: Neighborhood Structure and Policy Diffusionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…As a result, the more the proportion of rural residents are, the more 7 The question of what is the optimal neighborhood size is largely dependent on the relative strength of neighbors and is particularly important when one seeks to examine the dynamic equilibrium of a spatial game. As Gu (2013)'s research shows that the choice of the optimal neighborhood size typically is influenced not solely by the quality of the various competing strategies, but by the effect of the frequency with which those various competing strategies are found in the population. As a result, the optimal neighborhood size is not invariable when the competition pattern changes.…”
Section: Spatial Determination Of Policy Diffusionmentioning
confidence: 97%
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“…Competition among players may not result in the best outcome for all players, yet if all players pursue a strategy of cooperation, then it is possible that the outcome could be mutually beneficial. Gu (2015) treated institutions of higher education (IHE) as players in a game whose objective was to maximize tuition. When the IHEs colluded on price, an optimum price result (for the IHEs) was achieved.…”
Section: Game Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, these studies have neglected factors at the spatial level. Neighbouring universities interact with each other and thereby influence each other (Gu, 2012(Gu, , 2013. A few studies have found that the distance has an impact on the commercialisation of academic patents (Buenstorf & Schacht, 2011;Holm et al, 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%