Price competition and store competition: Store brands vs. national brand

“…It is possible that no one wants to move first in a game of perfect information, which would result in a lower profit level as decisions are exposed to the competitors. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the firstmover advantage has been discussed in Choi and Fredj [44], they demonstrate that there exists a first-mover advantage for the retailer when the market is fully covered.…”

Section: Corollarymentioning

confidence: 85%

Game Theoretical Perspectives on Pricing Decisions in Asymmetric Competing Supply Chains

Tan

Liu

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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This paper investigates a dual exclusive channel model in which each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, but two goods are substitute. The decision rule between two channels is Nash game in Case 1, while it is Stackelberg game in Case 2. From manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Nash game (VN) theoretic perspectives, nine game models are developed to examine the effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions at both horizontal competition and vertical competition levels. The analysis suggests that the type of price leadership scenarios, the level of product substitutability, and the relative channel status play a significant role in decision making. For instance, in case 1, the symmetric leadership (two manufacturers or two retailers are leaders) is always the dominant strategy and equilibrium for either two manufacturers or two retailers regardless of product substitutability and relative channel status. Nevertheless, the asymmetric leadership may lead channel members to encounter a prisoner’s dilemma if the relative channel status is small. By contrast, in Case 2, the symmetric leadership is not the unique dominant strategy for either two manufacturers or two retailers. In contrast to many earlier results, we also show that whether the first-mover and the late-mover advantages exist, depending on the level of related channel status.

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“…It is shown that the leadership structure to maximize the total profit depends on the demand function and the total profit is maximized when no one dominates the market with a linear demand. Choi and Fredj (2013) addressed the analysis of the supply chain model with a manufacturer and 1 Takuya TSUBOI * , Tatsushi NISHI * and Guoqing ZHANG * * * Graduate School of Engineering Science Osaka University 1-3, Machikaneyama-cho, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-8531, Japan * * Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems, University of Windsor 401 Sunset Avenue Windsor, Canada Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers Tsuboi, Nishi and Zhang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.12, No.3 (2018) two retailers. They analyzed the leader-follower relationship between the manufacturer and two retailers, and between two retailers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers

Tsuboi

Nishi

Zhang

2018

JAMDSM

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We address a game theoretical analysis of the leadership structure of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier and a single retailer involving a risky supplier under demand uncertainty. The risky supplier has a risk of unavailability of delivering the product to the retailer. The equilibrium solutions for different leadership structures are analytically derived. The influence of the probability of risky supplier availability on the optimal leadership structure is investigated. The model is extended to consider a two-echelon supply chain with two risky suppliers. The total profits for each leadership structure are evaluated from the perspective of the entire supply chain. The analytical results show that the leadership structure with the risky supplier as a leader can maximize the total profit. Numerical examples are provided to show the validity of the proposed analysis.

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Price competition and store competition: Store brands vs. national brand

Cited by 115 publications

References 28 publications

Managing channel profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chains

Managing channel profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chains

Game Theoretical Perspectives on Pricing Decisions in Asymmetric Competing Supply Chains

Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers

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