Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach

Schmidt, Martín

doi:10.18267/j.efaj.137

Cited by 6 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Esse incentivo traz 8 Enquadram-se com PMEs empresas com receita bruta igual ou inferior a três milhões e seiscentos mil reais por anocalendário (Brasil, 2006). como externalidades positivas o aumento da competitividade entre fornecedores (Schmidt, 2015), o fortalecimento da economia regional (Cunha & Bourlegat, 2016) e o estímulo ao desenvolvimento nacional sustentável (Brasil, 1993).…”

Section: Atuação Das Pme No Processo De Contratações Públicasunclassified

Efeito do atraso de pagamentos nos Custos de Transação em contratações públicas

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Quais são os efeitos dos atrasos de pagamentos na atuação das Pequenas e Microempresas (PME) no processo de contratação pública? Quais são os efeitos da introdução de um mecanismo normativo/legal que suprime a cláusula que permite compradores-públicos atrasar os pagamentos? Saber o efeito dessas cláusulas nos Custos de Transação (CT) é um passo importante para apoiar (ou não) o argumento comum de que essas cláusulas devem ser suprimidas dos contratos. Esta pesquisa se fundamenta na Análise Econômica do Direito (AED), uma abordagem que busca antever a eficiência da estrutura de incentivos das normas com objetivo de propor um mecanismo para reduzir CT em contratações públicas. Para isso, foram realizadas simulações que reproduzem o comportamento de PME em pregões eletrônicos realizados por órgãos públicos entre 2016 e 2018. A contribuição dessa pesquisa é mostrar como compradores-públicos podem se beneficiar duplamente quando pagam os contratos em dia e porque a AED pode ser uma abordagem mais apropriada do que a Teoria de CT quando o problema de CT está associado a uma norma ou lei que se aplica a todas as transações.

show abstract

Section: Atuação Das Pme No Processo De Contratações Públicasunclassified

Efeito do atraso de pagamentos nos Custos de Transação em contratações públicas

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, the most economically attractive bid is sought in some countries regardless of price. Bidders determine bid prices using costs associated with the performance of the contract and the expected number of bidders (Schmidt, 2015). Only bidders who meet all the requirements and offer the lowest price are awarded the contract.…”

Section: Market Logics and Tendering Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Only bidders who meet all the requirements and offer the lowest price are awarded the contract. When a most economically advantageous tender is used as an award criterion, it is aimed at contracting out a supplier whose tender achieved the best ratings in terms of price or utility value (Schmidt, 2015). Buying firms decide which goods and services to purchase on the basis of their money price (Maniadakis et al, 2018).…”

Section: Market Logics and Tendering Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

An examination of SME involvement in public procurement under bid lot sizing

Namagembe

Mpeera

Kalid

2021

JOPP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose This study aims to examine the influence of market logics on tendering capabilities and small and medium enterprise (SME) involvement in public procurement, the influence of SME governance mechanisms on tendering capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement and the influence of tendering capabilities on SME involvement in public procurement. Design/methodology/approach Data was collected from owners/managers of SMEs registered by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority. The SPSS software and CB-SEM software were used to obtain results on the influence of market logics on tendering capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement, the influence of SME governance mechanisms on tendering capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement and the influence of tendering capabilities on SME involvement in public procurement. Findings Findings indicated that SME involvement in public procurement is mainly influenced by their governance mechanisms whilst both market logics and governance mechanisms had a positive influence on tendering capabilities of SME firms. Market logics and tendering capabilities had no effect on SME involvement. Research limitations/implications The study mainly focussed on SMEs’ involvement in public procurement. The research has implications for decision makers in government and SME firms concerned with enhancing levels of SME involvement in public procurement activities. Originality/value Many governments are now focussing on procurement lot sizing so as to increase SME involvement in public procurement. Despite the use of lot sizing, SME involvement in public procurement is still low in many developing countries and also declining in others. Aspects such as market logics and governance mechanisms that may help understand the variations in involvement have not been given significant attention.

show abstract

“…In addition, some papers discuss the application of this theory from the aspect of defining an appropriate contract model [24,25]. e interest of some authors was focused on publicprivate procurement [26,27], on resolving disputes or cooperation in the PBMC project implementation [9,28].…”

Section: Regular Road Maintenance In Montenegro According To the Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proposition of a Model for Selection of the Hybrid Contract Implementation Strategy for a Pilot Project of Regular Road Maintenance in Montenegro

Rutešić

Ćetković

Lakić

et al. 2020

Advances in Civil Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Performance-based maintenance contracts (PBMCs) are modern contracts that should allow road maintenance entities to contract maintenance activities more successfully and generate money value. In the case of Montenegro, a gradual approach of PBMC introduction is recommended through a hybrid contract for routine road maintenance. Hybrid contract implementation will enable a lower level of client risk in the early stages of PBM contract. Game theory is used for selection of an adequate model for hybrid contract structure in terms of size and nature of the BoQ elements. In addition to the estimated or charged quantities of works from previous contracts, the model also includes parameters that to some extent take into account the experience and expertise of contractors and clients, but also the availability of road data. In order for model to be applied, historical data from traditional road maintenance contracts, which were implemented in the previous period in Montenegro, are used.

show abstract

Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach

Cited by 6 publications

References 16 publications

Efeito do atraso de pagamentos nos Custos de Transação em contratações públicas

Efeito do atraso de pagamentos nos Custos de Transação em contratações públicas

An examination of SME involvement in public procurement under bid lot sizing

Proposition of a Model for Selection of the Hybrid Contract Implementation Strategy for a Pilot Project of Regular Road Maintenance in Montenegro

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About