Price Discrimination

Phlips, Louis

doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1413-1

Cited by 12 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Stigler (1987) Indeed, the need for price discrimination to go hand-in-glove with some form of product differentiation has been recognized from the start in economics (Phlips, 1981). The classic examples of price discrimination listed above do not involve identical goods.…”

Section: Price Discriminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illustrations of Price Discrimination in Baseball

Rascher

Schwarz

2012

The Oxford Handbook of Sports Economics

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This article explores the ticket pricing behavior of the clubs to illustrate the theory of price discrimination. An example presented shows how useful it is to be flexible in recognizing that while a box seat to a game is not an identical product to an upper reserved seat at the same game, the two tickets sufficiently share the core product that the price discrimination framework is useful for analyzing pricing, even if the products are clearly not identical on every dimension of quality. It is stated that every single Major League Baseball ticket is sold under some form of price discrimination. As teams grow increasingly sophisticated in their pricing strategies, price discrimination is becoming more precise, more widespread, and more profitable, while at the same time providing more opportunities for more fans to find tickets at a price they are willing to pay.

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Section: Price Discriminationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illustrations of Price Discrimination in Baseball

Rascher

Schwarz

2012

The Oxford Handbook of Sports Economics

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“…Several reasons for which producers tended to reduce to a minimum the seasonal price variations can be suggested. Firstly, optimal intertemporal pricing tends to reduce price variations for storable commodities in the presence of short-run increasing marginal costs (see Phlips (1983)). Secondly, firm could fin it more difficul to monitor an agreement with a scheme of discounts.…”

Section: Timingmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical oligopoly model of a regulated market

Pazó

Jaumandreu

1999

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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We model a three fir o ligopoly ( the S panish f ertilizer i ndustry f rom 1 976 t o 1988) which was subject to price regulation in the form of price ceilings. A theoretical and econometric model is developed in order to identify simultaneously the behaviour of the firm and the degree to which regulation constrained the price. The collusive market-sharing arrangements involving asymmetric firms a nd t he l ess c ollusive o utcomes o f C ournot and Stackelberg, together with their constrained counterparts, are considered as particular behavioural hypotheses. The estimation of an aggregated and a disaggregated version of the model, by General Method of Moments techniques, leads us to identify the regulationconstrained Stackelberg equilibrium as the most likely outcome given the observed data.

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“…Indeed in the multi-product context, product-specific average costs are not in general well-defined, and the definitions of economies of scale and natural monopoly must be significantly generalized (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) competitive conditions, economic activity will be organized so as to economize on production costs plus transactions costs (Williamson (1985) (Phlips (1983)). …”

Section: Scope and Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%