Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks

Vogelsang, Ingo

doi:10.1257/002205103322436205

Cited by 117 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…Previous Literature. From a theoretical point of view, a wealth of studies have analyzed access charges in telecommunications networks (see, for example , Armstrong 2002;Vogelsang 2003;Guthrie 2006), some of which have also gone on to account for investment dynamics (Bourreau and Dogan 2006;Klumpp and Su 2010). Given the high interests at stake, it is not surprising to also find a considerable number of policy papers regarding the question.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unbundling the Incumbent: Evidence From Uk Broadband

Nardotto

Valletti

Verboven

2015

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We consider the impact of a regulatory process forcing an incumbent telecom operator to make its local broadband network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines and offer Internet services directly to customers. Employing a very detailed data set covering the whole of the United Kingdom, we find that, over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of unbundling. LLU entry only had a positive effect on broadband penetration in the early years, and no longer in the recent years as the market reached maturity. In contrast, LLU entry continues to have a positive impact on the quality of the service provided, as entrants differentiate their products upwards compared to the incumbent. We also assess the impact of competition from an alternative form of technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter‐platform competition has a positive impact on both penetration and quality.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unbundling the Incumbent: Evidence From Uk Broadband

Nardotto

Valletti

Verboven

2015

Journal of the European Economic Association

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“…Until recently, regulatory authorities had been dealing with existing infrastructures without seeking to promote investment with an increasing return to scale, therefore linear pricing was sufficient. Furthermore, in the access and interconnection pricing literature, nonlinear access prices are hardly discussed, unlike nonlinear downstream prices (Vogelsang (2003)). However, nonlinear risk sharing arrangements were already been advocated in 2009 by Nitsche and Wiethaus (2009).…”

Section: The Ec Recommendation Encourages Nonlinear Wholesale Price Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Replicability Tests for Next-Generation Access Networks

Jaunaux¹,

Lebourges²

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper discusses the relevant cost standard for the economic replicability test for Next-Generation Access (NGA) networks, described in the Recommendation on Costing and Non-discrimination adopted by the European Commission. We demonstrate that a cost standard that implies fully fixed and variable cost recovery for the access seeker would be incompatible with the economics of NGA networks and that such a test would deter NGA investment. We show that to reconcile investment and competition, the wholesale price must be a two-part tariff and the economic replicability test should only be based on variable wholesale prices. We underline that during a transition phase, until competitors have secured access to NGA infrastructure, a temporary second test called the "competition migration test" should be added to ensure incumbent NGA retail prices do not foreclose copper-based efficient entrants. The tests we propose surpass the limits of the "ladder of investment" theory by including the "business migration effect" developed by Bourreau et al. (2012).

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“…However, the price increase is solely due to a reciprocal access fee between the firms-by raising the fee, the firms ensure that they charge high prices to customers. See Vogelsang [2003] for a review of the literature on access pricing in telecommunications.…”

Section: I(i) Related Theoretical Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Anti-Competitive Interconnection: The Effects of the Elasticity of Consumers’ Expectations and the Shape of the Network Effects Function

Alexandrov¹

2012

SSRN Journal

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Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks

Cited by 117 publications

References 65 publications

Unbundling the Incumbent: Evidence From Uk Broadband

Unbundling the Incumbent: Evidence From Uk Broadband

Economic Replicability Tests for Next-Generation Access Networks

Anti-Competitive Interconnection: The Effects of the Elasticity of Consumers’ Expectations and the Shape of the Network Effects Function

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