Price Response of Marketed Surplus of Foodgrains

Bardhan, Pranab; Bardhan, Kalpana

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041193

Cited by 13 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…For example, in a detailed study using cross-sectional data from 27 villages in northern India, Kalpana Bardhan (1970) found a short-run marketed surplus elasticity ranging between -0.33 and -0.60. However, in another article with Pranab Bardhan (1971) using macro-level time series data, the same author found evidence that the marketed surplus elasticity was positive. Kalpana Bardhan's original study has also been criticized by Haessel (1975) for not allowing for interaction between marketings and prices.…”

Section: Own-consumption and The Marketed Surplusmentioning

confidence: 97%

Perverse supply response in peasant agriculture: A review

Ozanne

1999

Oxford Development Studies

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The long-running debate concerning the special characteristics of peasant production in less developed countries which may lead to perverse supply responses in their agricultural sectors is explored. Four stages in the debate are identified. The first was based on casual observation and the target income or fixity-of-wants hypothesis. The second took account of peasant own-consumption and focused on the marketed surplus. The third addressed the possible effect of uncertainty and risk aversion on supply response. The fourth is embodied in modern farm household models of peasant behaviour. Although the predictions regarding supply response derived from these models vary, they all suggest that agricultural supply response may be negative. The bulk of empirical evidence, however, for both total production and marketed surplus tends to refute the notion, whether it is theoretically consistent or not, that supply response in peasant agriculture is negative.

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Section: Own-consumption and The Marketed Surplusmentioning

confidence: 97%

Perverse supply response in peasant agriculture: A review

Ozanne

1999

Oxford Development Studies

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“…Interestingly, the hypothesis that high-level corruption by officials led to instability in the DPR can also be related to the patron-client relationship that Russia shares with the DPR. It was due to Russia's displeasure about the embezzlement that many steps were taken to ensure that, at least temporarily, actors who wished to embezzle would 68 Mirimanova,Connectivity,18. 69 Mirimanova,Connectivity,19. 70 Odehov, Crimes. be dissuaded. While there is less information regarding corruption within the Luhansk "People's Republic," it can also be suggested that as long as corruption within the region stays relatively low-level, such as stable patron-client relationships and other petty forms of corruption, it is acting as a contributing factor towards stable governance.…”

Section: The Role Of Corruption In the War Economy And Coping Economiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corrupting or Stabilizing: The Political Economy of Corruption in Donbas’s “People’s Republics”

Gricius

2019

KMLPJ

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A wide range of normative implications exists between corruption and the stability of de-facto states. While some claim that corruption inherently disrupts institutional development and stumps economic growth, others argue that corruption in some cases acts as a stabilizing factor for authoritarian regimes. Regardless, corruption generally plays a role in the political economy of any state. In de-facto states, corruption tends to play an outsized role, either or equally impacting the exercise of political authority or the allocation of public goods and services. This research aims to examine the case study of the Luhansk and Donetsk "People's Republics" and the relationship between corruption and governance in these two de-facto regions to better understand how corruption and stability are interrelated. Methodologically, I plan to use mostly political economy methods, namely focusing on using Goodhand's framework of analyzing different economies during conflict. I will rely mostly on open-source information for this preliminary research to determine what the governance structure is, namely focusing on the DPR's and the LPR's respective governments.

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“…In a time-series study using Indian macro data, it was reported that the response of marketed surplus was positive for different measures of price incentives (Bardhan and Bardhan, 1971). But the estimation did not permit interactions between prices and sales.…”

Section: Marketed Surplusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agricultural supply response: A survey

Rao¹

1989

Agricultural Economics

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Rao, J.M., 1989. Agricultural supply response: a survey. Agric. Econ., 3: 1-22.This paper surveys the literature on agricultural supply response to prices in developing countries. Empirical estimates of elasticities depend both on the methodology adopted and on countryspecific factors relating to technology, economic structure and macro constraints. The paper seeks to establish some general conclusions on supply responsiveness within these limitations. Supply response to output prices at the aggregate and at the crop levels is considered first. Crop-specific acreage elasticities range between zero and 0.8 in the short run while long-run elasticities tend to be higher -between 0.3 and 1.2. Yield elasticities are smaller and less stable than acreage elasticities. Clearly, inter-crop pricing can be relied upon to effect shifts in the commodity composition of agricultural output. Evidence also suggests that supply elasticities vary systematically with such factors as price and yield risks, multiple-cropping, the importance of the crop, farm incomes, farm size, tenancy and literacy. The most controversial and important aspect of supply response is the effect on aggregate agricultural output of agriculture's terms of trade. Conventional time-series estimates range from 0.1 to 0.3. A major cross-country study reports an aggregate elasticity as high as 1.66. It is argued that cross-country estimates are apt to exaggerate aggregate responsiveness while time-series studies underestimate it somewhat. For LDCs, a tentative range of 0.4 to 0.5 seems plausible. Hence, the distributive effects of the terms of trade are likely to be more significant than the allocative effects. Asian evidence shows that only a third of the inter-country differences in fertilizer use can be attributed to fertilizer price policies. Provided new technologies and infrastructure are in place, fertilizer subsidies can help in technology diffusion and in overcoming credit constraints. The choice between price supports and input subsidies will depend on a variety of country-or situation-specific factors. Nevertheless, a significant general factor favoring price supports is that they can more easily be coupled with price stabilization goals than input subsidies. Though sparse, the available evidence on the response of marketed surplus suggests that price policy is not a reliable instrument for regulating inter-sectoral trade. . Economic incentives and supply responseThe importance of agricultural price policies in economic development derives from three key characteristics of agriculture: (a) it is the dominant production and employment sector in LDCs, particularly at low levels of devel-0169-5150/89/$03.50

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Price Response of Marketed Surplus of Foodgrains

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Perverse supply response in peasant agriculture: A review

Perverse supply response in peasant agriculture: A review

Corrupting or Stabilizing: The Political Economy of Corruption in Donbas’s “People’s Republics”

Agricultural supply response: A survey

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