Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro

doi:10.5923/j.m2economics.20120101.03

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…They show that if the goods are substitutes, then the capitalist firm chooses over-capacity and the state-owned firm under-capacity. In addition, Ohnishi (2012a) focuses on the role that production subsidies play in a Bertrand mixed duopoly and shows that the results are the same as those of the existing Cournot mixed market literature.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

“…Bös (1984), Cremer et al (1991), Bárcena-Ruiz (2007), Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2007) and Ohnishi (2012a) examine price-setting competition with homogeneous goods or differentiated goods. For instance, Cremer et al (1991) investigate a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a mixed oligopoly model where firms choose their location and price, and they demonstrate that the case of mixed oligopoly with one state-owned firm may be socially preferable to that of private oligopoly.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor

Ohnishi¹

2020

Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice

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This article considers two Stackelberg games in which a state-owned firm competes against a foreign labour-managed firm. The first game is as follows. In the first stage, the state-owned firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, the foreign labour-managed firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the third stage, both firms simultaneously and independently choose actual outputs. The structure of the second game is nearly identical and differs only in the order in which the firms decide on the offer of lifetime employment in the first two stages. This study presents the equilibrium outcomes of these two Stackelberg games.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 54%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor

Ohnishi¹

2020

Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice

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“…The second category includes studies where privatization is further classified into two parts: privatization as a discrete variable (See Anderson et al [3], Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon [5].) and privatization as a continuous variable (see Matsumura [22], Fujiwara [13], Ohnishi [26], Ohnishi [27], Wang and Chen [34], Wang and Chiou [35], Wang and Chiou [36], Wen and Yuan [37]. ).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Ranking for Optimal Privatization Level

Paul,

2023

Preprint

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We analyze a mixed duopoly market with a public and a private firm competing in the downstream market. The public firm is partially privatized and a regulator decides on the privatization level to maximize welfare. A foreign monopolist supplies a key input for producing the final commodity, and may use uniform or discriminatory pricing; we observe the presence of a foreign monopolist that practices price discrimination can lead to the privatization of a public firm. The overall findings show, that under uniform pricing, Cournot competition leads to higher privatization levels, while under discriminatory pricing, Bertrand competition leads to higher privatization levels. The sensitivity of Cournot-Bertrand rankings to substitutability depends on the pricing regime. JEL classification code: D4, D6, H4, L1,L2

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“…Hence, these studies assume that HSR operators maximize a weighted sum of their own profit and social welfare due to this regulation by the government. This assumption has been conventionally used in previous studies that discuss the welfare consequences of the partial privatization of a public firm in a mixed oligopoly market (Matsumura, 1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transportation policy for high-speed rail competing with airlines

Tsunoda

2018

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice

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This study investigates the desirable transportation policy for a government seeking to regulate the competition between high-speed rail (HSR) and air transportation. To address this issue, we construct a game-theoretic model. A basic assumption underlying the model is that the airline maximizes its own profit whereas the HSR operator maximizes a weighted sum of profit and social welfare due to the government regulation. We assume a two-stage game in which the government sets the weight to maximize social welfare in the first stage and the HSR operator and the airline maximize their respective objective functions in the second stage. The central result from our model is that partial public regulation arises as a subgame perfect equilibrium unless the benefits to consumers from using the HSR are sufficiently large or sufficiently small compared to the benefits to consumers from using air transportation. The result provides a theoretical foundation for the public policies of joint investments by both governments and HSR operators in HSR networks in European and Asian countries. In addition, our results suggest that the optimal regulation by the government depends on the benefits for consumers using each mode of transport and the difference between the levels of benefits.

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Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Cited by 7 publications

References 36 publications

Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor

Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor

Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Ranking for Optimal Privatization Level

Transportation policy for high-speed rail competing with airlines

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