Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

Yue, Jiguang; Austin, Jill; Huang, Zhimin; Chen, Bintong

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.007

Cited by 80 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…For convenience and simplify the problem behind in this paper, we assume that the third derivative of ( ) is positive, i.e., ′′′ ( ) > 0. (Notes : we review the demand function related to cooperative advertising and game, we find that the most literatures either adopt a square root function ( [19]- [24]) or a power function ( [5], [19], [25], [26]) to describe the form of the market demand related to advertising expenditures, while only few literature [27], [28] use the linear demand function. So, we do not consider the linear demand, after computing the third order derivative of the other demand function(i.e., the square root function and the power function)with respect to advertising expenditures, we give the assumptions above).…”

Section: Assumptions and The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Jiang¹

2018

IJAPM

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Abstract:The loss averse retailer sells the newsboy type of product to the consumers in a one-period two-echelon supply chain, where the risk neutral manufacturer supply the product to the retailer. When the market demand only depend on the retailer's advertising investment and is uncertain, this paper discusses the manufacturer's participation rate ,the retailer's advertising expenditures and order quantity decision problems in a Stackelberg game. After characterizing the equilibrium solution of this game, this paper show the effect of each parameter on optimal decisions. The results reveal that the loss averse retailer's optimal order quantity is less than the risk neutral retailer's optimal decision and decrease as the loss aversion level increases. Maybe it's the reason that the upstream manufacturer will share the advertising investment of the downstream retailer, the retailer's optimal local advertising expenditure is yet greater than the risk neutral retailer's optimal decision and is increasing in the loss aversion level. When the degree of loss aversion become larger ,the manufacturer's optimal participation rate first increases and then decreases until zero. The numerical example is given to analyze the effects of parameter on some optimal decisions and also confirm the relevant conclusion.

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Section: Assumptions and The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Jiang¹

2018

IJAPM

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“…Analyzing the research on the supply chain coordination mechanism, the literature mainly focuses on such aspects as pricing [24][25][26][27][28], quantity discount [29,30], information sharing [31,32], profit distribution [33][34][35], and cost sharing [36][37][38][39][40], analyzes supply chains under either centralized or decentralized decision-making, and provides coordination strategies. Although the literature on the supply chain coordination mechanism is rich, it rarely pays attention or neglects the CSR of supply chains, making it difficult for relevant CSR to satisfy the realistic requirements of supply chain management.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Cost Sharing of Corporate Social Responsibility

Liu

Quan

et al. 2018

Sustainability

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Abstract:The competition of modern enterprises has shifted from brand competition among enterprises of the past to that of supply chains; and considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) within supply chain management has become an inevitable requirement for improving the competitiveness of enterprises and conforms to the trend of standardization of social responsibility guidelines. This paper deals with channel coordination and decision-making in a CSR supply chain that is comprised of a dominant retailer and n homogeneous suppliers. The Stackelberg game is employed to analyze the optimal decision-making of this supply chain under either decentralized or centralized decision-making processes. After that, the thought and method of super conflict equilibrium are used to design the coordination decision-making mechanism of this supply chain based on the cost sharing of CSR to solve channel conflict and to optimize the decision. The results show that the proposed mechanism based on the cost sharing of CSR is better than those with only either the retailer or the suppliers being CSR; and it can well describe the relationship between the retailer and the suppliers, and increase the eagerness of the retailer and suppliers to carry out their CSR under various circumstances without having the profits adversely affected. As a matter of fact, this mechanism maximizes the profits of the entire supply chain system and also enhances the competitiveness of the chain.

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“…Within a vertical cooperative advertising program framework, Aust and Buscher [9] considered four possible relationships between channel members and found that the highest total profit was gained when both players cooperated and negotiated the allocation, which gave customers a better position because it resulted in the lowest retail prices and the highest advertising expenditures compared to other configurations. Papers [10][11][12] also discussed advertising models in the supply chain using different game configurations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain

Guo

2018

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment. The results found that the manufacturer's choice was to hold all bargaining power; however, due to the remaining information problem, the retailer still had a profit; in contrast, the retailer was only willing to give up bargaining power if the manufacturer's profit was reserved. The optimal bargaining power allocation was found to be strongly related to the ability to convert and monitor technology, with the bargaining power gradually shifting to the manufacturer as the technology improved. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results.

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Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

Cited by 80 publications

References 14 publications

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

Supply Chain Cooperative Advertising and Ordering Model for the Loss Averse Retailer

A Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Cost Sharing of Corporate Social Responsibility

Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain

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