Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

Chen, Lin; Peng, Jin; Liu, Zhibing; Zhao, Ruiqing

doi:10.1080/00207543.2016.1204475

Cited by 127 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Chen et al [47] investigated the impact of power structure on the retail service in a dual channel supply chain. Chen et al [48] examined the effects of power structure on the pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information. Zheng et al [49] studied the impact of the power structure on dual-channel closed-loop supply chain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic and Environmental Performance of Fashion Supply Chain: The Joint Effect of Power Structure and Sustainable Investment

2017

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Fashion supply chain members now search for trade-offs between sustainable investment and the related incentives, such as savings on environmental taxes and gains in incremental demands. To evaluate the economic and environmental performance of sustainable investment from a power perspective, we develop an analytical model to study a two-echelon sustainable supply chain consisting of one retailer and one manufacturer with three different power structures. We derive the optimal solutions for various cases associated with different supply chain power structures and sustainable investors. Though it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to make sustainable investment, they often utilize high power to gain economic benefit with less sustainable investment. Interestingly, the follower with less supply chain power has more incentive to make a sustainable effort to achieve a higher profit. The optimal amount of sustainable investment in the apparel manufacturer investment case is greater than that in the retailer investment case in most scenarios.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic and Environmental Performance of Fashion Supply Chain: The Joint Effect of Power Structure and Sustainable Investment

2017

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“…Recently, Huang and Ke [8] applied uncertainty theory to a pricing decision problem in a supply chain with one common retailer. Besides, Chen et al [39] studied an effort decision problem in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain information. However, both of them did not consider the pricing problem in a supply chain with competing retailers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Decision in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Competing Retailers Under Uncertain Environment

et al. 2017

J. Uncertain. Anal. Appl.

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This paper explores a supply chain pricing competition problem in a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturing costs, sales costs, and market bases are all characterized as uncertain variables whose distributions are estimated by experts' experienced data. In consideration of channel members' different market powers, three decentralized game models are employed to explore the equilibrium behaviors in corresponding decision circumstances. How the channel members should choose their most profitable pricing strategies in face of uncertainties is derived from these models. Numerical experiments are conducted to examine the effects of power structures and parameters' uncertain degrees on the pricing decisions of the members. The results show that the existence of dominant powers in the supply chain will increase the sales prices and reduce the profit of the whole supply chain. It is also found that the supply chain members may benefit from higher uncertain degrees of their own costs while the other supply chain members will gain less profits. Additionally, the results demonstrate that the uncertainty of the supply chain will make end consumers pay more. Some other interesting managerial highlights are also obtained in this paper.

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“…Our use of the ultimatum game in which all participants played the role of both sender and receiver permits us to generate a proxy for the beliefs or expectations elicited by [4] without directly asking participants what they believed others would find acceptable. 8 From the perspective of B as a receiver, an Endogenous Index of unity identifies A's offer as a fair offer.…”

Section: Fairness Indicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fehr and Schmidt [7] note "Responders do not behave in a self-interest maximizing manner … the motive indicated for the rejection of positive, yet 'low', offers is that participants view them as unfair." 6 It is important to point out that the role of risk is currently a topic of substantial interest in the Management Science and Operations Research literature that considers the decisions made by a firm to supply output to multiple retailers (see [8] [9] [10]). Uncertainty can arise from retailer costs and market size.…”

Section: Doi: 104236/tel201776106 1570 Theoretical Economics Lettersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous versus Exogenous Fairness Indices in Repeated Ultimatum Games

Gomaa¹,

Mestelman²,

Nainar³

et al. 2017

TEL

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In ultimatum games, we often observe some participants rejecting offers that may be normally viewed as "fair" while others accept even lower offers that are typically viewed as "unfair". The objective of this study is to construct and examine an endogenous fairness index that helps explain this phenomenon. To achieve this objective, we construct a repeated ultimatum game environment in which each participant plays the roles of both the sender and the receiver with two different participants. We conjecture that the ratio of the amount that an individual receives divided by the amount the individual sends, captures the benchmark of what constitutes a fair offer for that individual when an offer-acceptance decision has to be made. Our design includes a fixed-and random-partners treatment in the repeated ultimatum game as an attempt to identify and isolate the effects of social distance on offer-acceptance decisions. In addition to the inclusion of the fairness indices in the offer-acceptance models, we introduce measures of social value orientations and risk attitudes as control variables in our analyses. We find that our belief-related fairness index is, in some cases, a better explanatory variable for offer-acceptance decisions than the conventional "offer index" and in other cases significantly augments the "offer index". As well, the offer-acceptance model including the belief-related fairness index can account for likelihoods of accepting less fair offers that can, at times, exceed likelihoods of accepting more fair offers.

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Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

Cited by 127 publications

References 39 publications

Economic and Environmental Performance of Fashion Supply Chain: The Joint Effect of Power Structure and Sustainable Investment

Economic and Environmental Performance of Fashion Supply Chain: The Joint Effect of Power Structure and Sustainable Investment

Pricing Decision in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Competing Retailers Under Uncertain Environment

Endogenous versus Exogenous Fairness Indices in Repeated Ultimatum Games

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