Pricing and revenue sharing mechanism for secondary redistribution of data service for mobile devices

Susanto, Hengky; Kaushik, Bhanu; Liu, Benyuan; Kim, Byung-Guk

doi:10.1109/pccc.2014.7017112

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…, which also implies that ({ }) decreases when → ( ) . Thus, in (14) decreases as → ( ) , which also satisfies property 1. That is, if ({ }) decreases, then, also decreases.…”

Section: Theorem 2: I-wfpmentioning

confidence: 70%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Secondary Mobile Data Market Business Model for ISP

Susanto¹

2020

IJCDS

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Recent advances in technology enable public or commercial establishments (for e.g. malls, coffee shops, airports) and individual data plan subscribers to operate as Wi-Fi providers (WFP), offering Internet access. However, the model of a monthly flat service fee charged by ISP to establishment or individual WFPs offers very little incentives for ISP to provide additional bandwidth to WFP's customers. Thus, these users may experience insufficient bandwidth when there is high demand for bandwidth. In addition, ISP even discourages individual subscribers to provide Internet access through their smartphone because such practices may cause market saturation. To address this, in this paper we propose a dynamic a business model (pricing scheme and a revenue sharing mechanism) that provides incentives for ISP to support establishment and individual Wi-Fi providers offering Internet access to users. Our revenue sharing model is based on Shapley value mechanism. Importantly, our proposed revenue sharing mechanism captures the power negotiation between ISP and Wi-Fi providers, and how shifts in the power balance between the two entities influence revenue division. Specifically, the model assures that the party who contributes more receives a higher portion of the revenue. In addition to that, the division of revenue eventually converges to a percentage value.

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“…, which also implies that ({ }) decreases when → ( ) . Thus, in (14) decreases as → ( ) , which also satisfies property 1. That is, if ({ }) decreases, then, also decreases.…”

Section: Theorem 2: I-wfpmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…where is the transmission power of user mobile device, is the channel gained from WFP to user , and 2 is the Gaussian noise variance for the channel between and [14]. In other words, ( ) is influenced by the channel quality and the amount of bandwidth.…”

Section: Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Secondary Mobile Data Market Business Model for ISP

Susanto¹

2020

IJCDS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…) This revenue distribution mechanism satisfies the following desired property [8], [15], [20], [21]: fairness or balanced contribution, which says that for any pair of servers i, j ∈ N S , j's contribution to i equals i's contribution to j, i.e.,…”

Section: A Shapley-value Revenue Sharing Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Game-theoretic Framework for Revenue Sharing in Edge-Cloud Computing System

Cao

Zhang

Liu

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE 37th International Performance Computing and Communications Conference (IPCCC)

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We introduce a game-theoretic framework to explore revenue sharing in an Edge-Cloud computing system, in which computing service providers at the edge of the Internet (edge providers) and computing service providers at the cloud (cloud providers) co-exist and collectively provide computing resources to clients (e.g., end users or applications) at the edge. Different from traditional cloud computing, the providers in an Edge-Cloud system are independent and self-interested. To achieve high system-level efficiency, the manager of the system adopts a task distribution mechanism to maximize the total revenue received from clients and also adopts a revenue sharing mechanism to split the received revenue among computing servers (and hence service providers). Under those system-level mechanisms, service providers attempt to game with the system in order to maximize their own utilities, by strategically allocating their resources (e.g., computing servers).Our framework models the competition among the providers in an Edge-Cloud system as a non-cooperative game. Our simulations and experiments on an emulation system have shown the existence of Nash equilibrium in such a game. We find that revenue sharing mechanisms have a significant impact on the system-level efficiency at Nash equilibria, and surprisingly the revenue sharing mechanism based directly on actual contributions can result in significantly worse system efficiency than Shapley value sharing mechanism and Ortmann proportional sharing mechanism. Our framework provides an effective economics approach to understanding and designing efficient Edge-Cloud computing systems.

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“…where ( ) and ( , ) denote user utility with bandwidth consumption and service cost, respectively. Considering the WFP is operating at frequency band , the utility function of bandwidth usage is defined as follows where is the transmission power of user mobile device, is the channel gained from WFP to user , and 2 is the Gaussian noise variance for the channel between and [14]. In other words, ( ) is influenced by the channel quality and the amount of bandwidth.…”

Section: A User Utility Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The simulation setup includes an WFP providing 1000MB/sec to users with initial minimum price charged by an ISP of 10 units currency, minimum profit desired by the WFP is 5 units currency, users maximum willingness to pay is 100 units currency, and user utility and price are measured and determined using eq. (9) and (14) respectively. In this scenario, we consider two case studies: ( ) When the WFP experiences lower and ( ) higher demand for bandwidth.…”

Section: A Revenue Sharing Between Isp and E-wfpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and revenue sharing in secondary market of mobile internet access

Susanto

Liu

Kim

et al. 2015

2015 IEEE 34th International Performance Computing and Communications Conference (IPCCC)

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent advances in technology enable public or commercial establishments (for e.g. malls, coffee shops, airports) and individual data plan subscribers to operate as Wi-Fi providers (WFP), offering Internet access. However, the model of a monthly flat service fee charged by ISP to establishment or individual WFPs offers very little incentives for ISP to provide additional bandwidth to WFP's customers. Thus, these users may experience insufficient bandwidth when there is high demand for bandwidth. In addition, ISP even discourages individual subscribers to provide Internet access through their smartphone because such practices may cause market saturation. To address this, in this paper we propose a dynamic pricing scheme and a revenue sharing mechanism that provide incentives for ISP to support establishment and individual Wi-Fi providers offering Internet access to users. Our revenue sharing model is based on Shapley value mechanism. Importantly, our proposed revenue sharing mechanism captures the power negotiation between ISP and Wi-Fi providers, and how shifts in the power balance between the two entities influence revenue division. Specifically, the model assures that the party who contributes more receives a higher portion of the revenue. In addition to that, the division of revenue eventually converges to a percentage value.Index Terms -Network Pricing, Wireless Ad hoc Network, Wi-Fi.

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Pricing and revenue sharing mechanism for secondary redistribution of data service for mobile devices

Cited by 6 publications

References 15 publications

Secondary Mobile Data Market Business Model for ISP

Secondary Mobile Data Market Business Model for ISP

A Game-theoretic Framework for Revenue Sharing in Edge-Cloud Computing System

Pricing and revenue sharing in secondary market of mobile internet access

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