2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2018.02.004
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Pricing decisions of competing supply chains under power imbalance structures

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Cited by 31 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 38 publications
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“…The member who makes decision first is considered to have more power over other members. To model this situation with a power retailer, Xiao et al (2014); Chen et al (2017); Li et al (2018b) etc. used Stackelberg game in which the retailer specifies the retail margin first.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The member who makes decision first is considered to have more power over other members. To model this situation with a power retailer, Xiao et al (2014); Chen et al (2017); Li et al (2018b) etc. used Stackelberg game in which the retailer specifies the retail margin first.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Assumption 5. In order to prevent the retailers from gaining more profits for the salvage value of the returned products than selling products, 0 < s < c + c h < 1 is assumed [17,41]. Let ϕ � c h − s denote marginal additional cost for returned products; then we have 0 < ϕ < 1.…”
Section: Assumptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most consumer returns are due to misfit, as determined by the consumer after purchase [14][15][16]. Many enterprises are adopting consumer return guarantee strategy, advertising, and offline showroom service to reduce consumer returns [17]. However, consumer returns policies also increase cost and bring negative impacts on retailers' benefits [13].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This article also relates to revenue management and supply chain problems (Li et al, 2018). Taylor (2016) derives the demand rate and the number of available suppliers in equilibrium for a given price and wage and then maximizes the platform's profit by optimizing the price and wage with two-point distributions for both customers' and suppliers' valuations.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%