Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect

Klumpp, Tilman; Polborn, Mattias

doi:10.2139/ssrn.611041

Cited by 106 publications

(170 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…3 Our theoretical framework is based on Klumpp and Polborn (2006). In this political contest model, candidates have to win the majority of electoral districts in order to obtain a prize -the party nomination.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Irfanoglu,

Mago,

Sheremeta

2015

SSRN Journal

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Sequential contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a "New Hampshire Effect" -a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Contrary to this prediction, however, our laboratory study of the three-battle contests shows that sequential contests generate significantly higher expenditure than simultaneous contests. In case of sequential contests, we observe significant over-expenditure in all three battles and find no evidence of the "New Hampshire Effect." Despite the strategic advantage, winners of the first battle make similar expenditures in the second battle as losers of the first battle. Moreover, instead of decreasing, subjects increase their expenditure in the second battle relative to the first battle. In case of simultaneous contests, subjects do not employ a uniform expenditure strategy and instead use a "guerilla warfare" strategy by focusing on only two of the three battles. We propose several explanations for these findings and discuss some implications.JEL Classifications: C72, C73, C91, D72

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…followed by days such as "Super Tuesday." Klumpp andPolborn (2006, p. 1076) state that the results of a completely sequential contest can apply to a mixed temporal contest, as long as the latter begins with at least a few sequential battles.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Irfanoglu,

Mago,

Sheremeta

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…This robust phenomenon has been documented in the case where individual battles are modeled either as all-pay auctions (Harris and Vickers, 1985;Konrad and Kovenock, 2005) or as lottery contests (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006); however, in the case of lottery contests, frontloading is less pronounced. Also, frontloading is less pronounced when there are intermediate prizes (Konrad and Kovenock, 2009) or when the final reward is more immediate (Konrad and Kovenock, 2005).…”

Section: War Of Attrition Games: Dynamic Contest Modelsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Klumpp and Polborn (2006), for example, provide evidence for strategic momentum and frontloading in the context of the U.S. presidential primaries. Support for strategic momentum is also found in sports settings (McFall et al, 2009;Malueg and Yates, 2010;Irfanoglu et al, 2015).…”

Section: War Of Attrition Games: Dynamic Contest Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

Kimbrough

Laughren

Sheremeta

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing both laboratory and field data, in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory. However, this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict. We finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges.JEL classifications: D72, D74, F51, F52, F54, H56, N4, Q34

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“…Other than this work, selection and incentives have generally been considered separately in the literature. For example, designing contests or tournaments so that they are effective in selecting the best competitor has been considered theoretically by Hvide and Kristiansen (2003), Rvykin andOrtmann (2008), andRvykin (2010), and empirically by Harbraugh and Klumpp (2005) and Klumpp and Polborn (2006). Regarding incentives, it has been shown theoretically (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and in the field (Sunde, 2009, Brown, 2011, Franke, 2012, and Genakos and Pagliero, 2012) that uneven contests elicit less effort from weaker participants.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selection and incentives in contests: evidence from horse racing

Brown

Yang

2016

Applied Economics Letters

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The designer of internal labour market promotion contests must balance the need to select the best candidate with the need to provide incentives for all candidates. We use an extensive data-set from horse racing -where there is abundant variation in contest design features -to analyse if there are particular features that help to achieve these two objectives. We find that contests with higher prize money, and fewer participants, are the most successful at achieving the dual remit of selection and incentives.JEL Classification: C3, D72, J24

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Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect

Cited by 106 publications

References 28 publications

New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

Selection and incentives in contests: evidence from horse racing

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