2000
DOI: 10.1001/archfami.9.5.458
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Primary Care Physician Incentives in Medical Group Practices

Abstract: Substantial variation exists in the types of primary care physician incentives implemented by medical groups. Base salary, individual productivity, and group financial performance were most frequently used to determine compensation. Physician personal financial risk was higher overall in group practices that derived more revenue from fee-for-service contracts.

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Cited by 13 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Of course, depending on the financial underpinnings and business model of the practice, substantial incentive pay (i.e., "bonus") may augment the base income and re-orient the physician incentives from "salary" to one of the alternative frames discussed. 49 In group practices in heavily capitated, managed care environments, bonus payments for salaried physicians based on group practice "net revenue" was a common incentive system 49 and proved an effective way to reduce cost per patient. 50 In predominantly FFS environments, salaried physicians are often rewarded for maximizing their visit-based productivity, thereby mimicking FFS payment incentives.…”
Section: Salary: Physician As Employeementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Of course, depending on the financial underpinnings and business model of the practice, substantial incentive pay (i.e., "bonus") may augment the base income and re-orient the physician incentives from "salary" to one of the alternative frames discussed. 49 In group practices in heavily capitated, managed care environments, bonus payments for salaried physicians based on group practice "net revenue" was a common incentive system 49 and proved an effective way to reduce cost per patient. 50 In predominantly FFS environments, salaried physicians are often rewarded for maximizing their visit-based productivity, thereby mimicking FFS payment incentives.…”
Section: Salary: Physician As Employeementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Counterbalancing these incentives are the theoretical incentives to invest in medical care that can decrease long‐term medical costs through disease prevention and early treatment. Practices reporting a larger proportion of income from capitated contracts are more likely to base primary care physician compensation on measures of quality and utilization 25 . Unfortunately, the incentives to make these investments are mitigated by the relatively high rates of turnover, as patients move from plan to plan, precluding long‐term financial benefit 26 .…”
Section: Capitation and The Shifting Locus Of Riskmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Practices reporting a larger proportion of income from capitated contracts are more likely to base primary care physician compensation on measures of quality and utilization. 25 Unfortunately, the incentives to make these investments are mitigated by the relatively high rates of turnover, as patients move from plan to plan, precluding long-term financial benefit. 26 Society's financial risk is minimal in the short term.…”
Section: Capitation and The Shifting Locus Of Riskmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is not the case for Norwegian salaried physicians, who have no economic incentives associated with referral. A study of American health organizations has shown that only 17% of primary physicians were salaried, without a bonus associated with patients' utilization of health services [14]. We know of only one American study in which purely salaried physicians are compared with other physicians in health organizations [15].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%