Primary Election Systems and Representation

Abstract

We examine how differences in the institutions that regulate candidate nomination procedures, specifically direct primary election laws, affect the types of candidates elected in nonpresidential American elections. We hypothesize that in more closed primary systems, control over candidate nominations by ideological extremists will translate into a higher likelihood that extreme candidates win in the general election. We hypothesize that in more open systems, participation by a wider spectrum of the electorate means that candidates must appeal to more moderate voters, leading to the election of more moderate candidates. Using pooled cross-section time-series regression analysis, we find that U.S. representatives from states with closed primaries take policy positions that are furthest from their district's estimated median voter's ideal positions. Representatives from states with semi-closed primaries are the most moderate. We conclude that the costs of strategic behavior created by electoral institutions have important consequences for electoral outcomes. 1. In this research we consider nominations to offices other than the presidency. Presidential nominations are characterized by a unique sequential state-by-state nomination process. Nominations via direct primary to congressional, state legislative, state executive, and local offices are characterized by common procedures which we describe below. 2. Ironically, after the Tashjian decision, the Republican Party removed the questionable provision from its bylaws and at the time of this writing, none of the state's major parties have opted to allow independents to participate in their primaries.

Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach

“…Existing evidence finds that U.S. Congressmen are more likely to vote in accord with the median constituent's preferences in open primary states than in closed primary states (Gerber and Morton, 1998;Besley and Case, 2003;Westley et al, 2004). If open primaries also promote median voter candidates in state legislatures (I am not aware of a study on this question), then we might expect greater congruence in states with open than closed primaries.…”

Primaries and Candidates: Examining the Influence of Primary Electorates on Candidate Ideology

“…3 These control variables account for candidate type (Jacobson, 1990;Jacobson and Kernell, 1983) (Gerber and Morton, 1998;Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman, 2003;McGhee et al, 2014). We exclude all nonpartisan primaries.…”

Analysing constitutional reform in Britain: Insights from economic approaches

“…If the primary electorate holds ideological preferences that differ to those of the party leadership, then candidates will face a strategic dilemma between pleasing the electorate and pleasing the party leadership. As long as primary contests are competitive, so that no candidate can be sure of winning, then candidates will locate at the ideal point of the primary electorate's median member and prioritise local concerns over national party priorities, which will serve to weaken -yet further -levels of party cohesion (Gerber and Morton, 1998;Muller, 2000). 18 The more extensive requirements for monitoring or transparency appear to deliver clear benefits for government accountability, since the more that ministers must reveal about their actions, the stronger the incentives they face to align their behaviour with public preferences.…”