2015
DOI: 10.3905/jpm.2015.41.6.021
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Principal–Agent Issues in Real Estate Funds and Joint Ventures

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Cited by 5 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…6 van der Spek (2017) finds quite similar differences between gross and net returns, by strategy, using a different data (comprising 440 [domestic and foreign] funds) and using a different methodology (he models, via simulation, the ex ante total [base and incentive] fees assuming differing real estate return distributions by strategy). incentive fees; however, as noted in Pagliari (2007) and Kritzman (2012), this reduction is largely a statistical illusion-as the investor essentially retains all of the downside risk.…”
Section: The Performance Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6 van der Spek (2017) finds quite similar differences between gross and net returns, by strategy, using a different data (comprising 440 [domestic and foreign] funds) and using a different methodology (he models, via simulation, the ex ante total [base and incentive] fees assuming differing real estate return distributions by strategy). incentive fees; however, as noted in Pagliari (2007) and Kritzman (2012), this reduction is largely a statistical illusion-as the investor essentially retains all of the downside risk.…”
Section: The Performance Datamentioning
confidence: 99%