Principal-agent theory in complex operations

Abstract

Originally developed for identifying costs of coordination between labor and management in economics, principal-agent theory challenged traditional explanations for friction in political relations, especially in a democracy, between elected officials and the permanent bureaucracy. Not without controversy, the approach recasts democratic civil -military relations, featuring as agent a unique, military 'bureaucrat' refining goals of the state, a role normally assigned to the principal. At the same time, principalagent applications reached international institutions as a collective actor in their own right. Drawing from civil -military relations and international institutions, this article poses still greater expansion for principal-agent dynamics. Principal-agent theory offers significant promise in complex international operations mixing inter-state, state, sub-state, and nongovernmental organizations because it clearly delineates culturally bounded normative arguments from resource-based logics; it also suggests moves such as building flexible membership institutions ahead of time to improve cooperation among international actors during the next crisis.

The Implications of Centre-local Relations on Service Delivery in Local Authorities in Zimbabwe: The Case of Chitungwiza

“…Caers (2006:26) argues that to counteract the agency conflict the theory recommends that certain measures must be put in place to help the principal to control the behaviour of the agent and align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. The theory as argued by Coletta (2013) recommends that the principal must construct incentive contracts to measure and compensate the performance of the agent. According to Caers (2006) there must be performance management in place for the principal to be in a position to monitor the behaviour of the agent.…”