It is easy to think of attention as a sensory mechanism divorced from the influence of an agent’s preferences and needs. However, according to active inference, such strict divisions cannot be invoked, since all cognitive and behavioural processes can be described as maximising the evidence for an agent’s generative model, which entails preferences that make an entity the thing it is. As such, attention — and perception more broadly — is constrained or enslaved by prior beliefs for which an agent must seek evidence. This paper demonstrates that this imperative is always at play in cognitive systems endowed with attentional schema, and that the preferences in question transcend the contingent, task-relevant goals that bias attention. Rather, attention is powerfully tuned by the most-deep rooted priors the agent possesses, such that, when sensory evidence against these priors is observed and free energy spikes, the agent attentionally prioritises the homeostatic restoration of these preferred states over their shorter-term desires. Thus, at its core, attention is a goal-driven process, which calls into question the putative distinction between endogenous – goal-directed, top-down – attention and exogenous – bottom-up, stimulus-driven, automatic – attention. What emerges in its place is a symbiotic relationship between attention and preferences, whereby the fulfilment of the latter rests on successful application of the former, and the former derives its function from the organismic need to confirm the latter.