Privacy preserving smartcard-based authentication system with provable security

Abstract

In this paper, we suggest a new privacy preserving smartcard‐based password authenticated key exchange (SC‐PAKE) with provable security. Only the user who has two secrets (smartcard and password) can go through authentication with key exchange while concealing its identifier from outsider adversaries. For guaranteeing both authentication and identity (ID) protection, we define a security of session key and an anonymity of identifier. We also show that the proposed protocol satisfies two definitions under computational Diffie–Hellman assumption and chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure symmetric encryption. One problem is how a common secure key (an encryption/decryption key) can be shared between a server and a user without letting the corresponding server know a certain ID of user. For this issue, we set two kinds of long‐term secrets; one is used to make a symmetric key for ID protection with user's ephemeral value, and the other is issued for helping agreement of a final session key for mutual authentication. Performance analysis shows that the proposed SC‐PAKE has better efficiency in computation and communication costs than recent SC‐PAKE schemes. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first scheme to guarantee both the session key security with authentication and privacy‐enjoying provable security. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Cryptanalysis and Improvement of a Two-Factor User Authentication Scheme

“…(1792 bits); however, it does not provide the security features like password exposure, smart card loss attack, sound repairability and user anonymity. Thus, our scheme has better performance than the related schemes [20], [14], [21].…”

“…Communication cost(bits) Islam [20] 1408 + 1408 = 2816 Jiang et al [14] 2304 + 1152 = 3456 Bym [21] 2176 + 1152 = 3328 Truong [22] 640 + 1152 = 1792 Wang-Wang [16] 1536 + 1152 = 2688 Ours 1536 + 1152 = 2688 Table III presents the computational cost of our scheme along with the related schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] in login and authentication phases. The computational cost of the schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] and our scheme are, respectively, 5t e + 6t h , 6t e + 8t h , 10t e + 2t s + 8t h , 4t c + 14t h , 6t e + 16t h and 6t e + 17t h . The scheme [21] has the higher computaional cost as compared to that of ours and does not offer the security features like verifier table, password friendly and timely typo detection.…”

“…The computational cost of the schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] and our scheme are, respectively, 5t e + 6t h , 6t e + 8t h , 10t e + 2t s + 8t h , 4t c + 14t h , 6t e + 16t h and 6t e + 17t h . The scheme [21] has the higher computaional cost as compared to that of ours and does not offer the security features like verifier table, password friendly and timely typo detection. The scheme [20] has the least computation cost; but it suffers from smart card loss attack.…”

“…In this section, we compare our scheme with that of the related schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] in terms of communication cost, computational cost and security fetures. Like in other works, we have not considered the cost of lightweight operations like exclusive-or and concatenation operations.…”

A secure chaotic maps‐based privacy‐protection scheme for multi‐server environments

“…About user anonymity, users on Internet requiring remote services may wish to do anonymously while still ensuring the confidentiality of their requests that services and resources received come from an authentic and qualified server . Thus, user anonymity is to provide a method for masking user's real identity during authentication, and no one can trace a specific user via transmitted messages.…”