2020
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2007.10361
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Privacy Preserving Visual SLAM

Abstract: This study proposes a privacy-preserving Visual SLAM framework for estimating camera poses and performing bundle adjustment with mixed line and point clouds in real time. Previous studies have proposed localization methods to estimate a camera pose using a line-cloud map for a single image or a reconstructed point cloud. These methods offer a scene privacy protection against the inversion attacks by converting a point cloud to a line cloud, which reconstruct the scene images from the point cloud. However, they… Show more

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Cited by 1 publication
(2 citation statements)
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References 46 publications
(80 reference statements)
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“…Mitigations for Attacks on Sparse Local Features. For reverse engineering attacks on local features, one notable recent work [43,13,42] proposes using line-based features to obfuscate the precise location of keypoints in the scene to make the reconstruction difficult. The key idea is to lift every keypoint location to a line with a random direction, but passing through the original 2D [13] or 3D keypoints [43].…”
Section: Defences and Mitigationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Mitigations for Attacks on Sparse Local Features. For reverse engineering attacks on local features, one notable recent work [43,13,42] proposes using line-based features to obfuscate the precise location of keypoints in the scene to make the reconstruction difficult. The key idea is to lift every keypoint location to a line with a random direction, but passing through the original 2D [13] or 3D keypoints [43].…”
Section: Defences and Mitigationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since the feature location can be anywhere on a line, this alleviates privacy implications in the standard mapping and localization process. Shibuya et al [42] later extended this approach for SLAM. Similarly, Dusmanu et al [10] represent a keypoint location as an affine subspace passing through the original point, as well as augmenting the subspace with adversarial feature samples, which makes it more difficult for an adversary to recover original image content.…”
Section: Defences and Mitigationsmentioning
confidence: 99%