Private agenda and re-election incentives

Abstract

Consider a politician who has to take two sequential decisions during his term in office.For each decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the decision that generates a public benefit, thus increasing his chances of re-election, and taking the decision that increases his private gain but is likely to decrease his chances of re-election. In our results we find that if the politician is a good enough decision maker and he desires to be re-elected enough, he takes the action that generates a public benefit regardless of his private interests. Moreover, we find that the behavior such that the politician delays taking the action that generates a public benefit to the last period of his term in office before he is up for re-election is optimal if and only if he has either very high or very low decision making skills.JEL Classification: D72, D81.

Effect of an Abrupt Change in Sexual and Reproductive Health Policy on Adolescent Birth Rates in Ecuador, 2008–2017

“…These empirical results are consistent with various theoretical interpretations. As alluded, the program can be understood in the context of a political trade-off between choosing what is better for population health versus what is best for a politician's own private benefit (Barro, 1973;Rivas, 2016). On the one hand, choices that enhance the health and living standards of citizens can improve the politician's chances of re-election.…”