Private Data Exfiltration from Cyber-Physical Systems Using Channel State Information

Burton, Thomas; Rasmussen, Kasper

doi:10.1145/3463676.3485606

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 40 publications

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“…Guri et al introduced AirHopper [22] and Air-Fi [18] attacks aimed bridging the air-gap between computers and a nearby smartphones by exploiting signals at various frequency bands. Other types of magnetic and electric covert channels have been discussed in recent years [12]. Bauer et al discussed the exploitation of anti-EMI features of processors for covert communication [11].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

ETHERLED: Sending Covert Morse Signals from Air-Gapped Devices via Network Card (NIC) LEDs

Guri

2022

2022 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)

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Highly secure devices are often isolated from the Internet or other public networks due to the confidential information they process. This level of isolation is referred to as an 'air-gap .' In this paper, we present a new technique named ETHERLED, allowing attackers to leak data from air-gapped networked devices such as PCs, printers, network cameras, embedded controllers, and servers. Networked devices have an integrated network interface controller (NIC) that includes status and activity indicator LEDs. We show that malware installed on the device can control the status LEDs by blinking and alternating colors, using documented methods or undocumented firmware commands. Information can be encoded via simple encoding such as Morse code and modulated over these optical signals.An attacker can intercept and decode these signals from tens to hundreds of meters away. We show an evaluation and discuss defensive and preventive countermeasures for this exfiltration attack.

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