Private Header (P-Header) Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for the 3GPP

Drage, Keith; Jesske, Roland; Holmberg, Christer

doi:10.17487/rfc7315

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…The security considerations for the P-Access-Network-Info header field are defined in [RFC7315]. The ABNF update defined in this document does not impact the security considerations.…”

Section: Security Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

P-Access-Network-Info ABNF Update

Holmberg¹

2016

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“…The security considerations for the P-Access-Network-Info header field are defined in [RFC7315]. The ABNF update defined in this document does not impact the security considerations.…”

Section: Security Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

P-Access-Network-Info ABNF Update

Holmberg¹

2016

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“…The security considerations for these "P-" header fields are defined in [RFC7315]. This specification allows some header fields to be present in messages where they were previously not allowed, and the security considerations and assumptions described in [RFC7315] (e.g., regarding only sending information to trusted entities) also apply to those messages.…”

Section: Security Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This specification allows some header fields to be present in messages where they were previously not allowed, and the security considerations and assumptions described in [RFC7315] (e.g., regarding only sending information to trusted entities) also apply to those messages. In addition, this specification also disallows some header fields to be present in messages where they were previously allowed.…”

Section: Security Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This document adds the ability to include P-Access-Network-Info in ACK requests. As documented in [RFC7315], P-Access-Network-Info may include privacy sensitive information, including the user's location. The security and privacy considerations for P-Access-Network-Info in ACK requests are similar to those for the other SIP requests discussed in [RFC7315].…”

Section: Security Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has identified cases where different Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] private header extensions referred to as "P-" header fields, and defined in [RFC7315], need to be included in SIP requests and responses currently not allowed according to RFC 7315. This document updates RFC 7315, in order to allow inclusion of the affected "P-" header fields in such requests and responses.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Updates to Private Header (P-Header) Extension Usage in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Requests and Responses

Holmberg¹,

Biondic²,

Salgueiro³

2016

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The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has identified cases where different SIP private header extensions referred to as "P-" header fields, and defined in RFC 7315, need to be included in SIP requests and responses currently not allowed according to RFC 7315. This document updates RFC 7315, in order to allow inclusion of the affected "P-" header fields in such requests and responses.This document also makes updates for RFC 7315 in order to fix misalignments that occurred when RFC 3455 was updated and obsoleted by RFC 7315.

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VoWi‐Fi security threats: Address resolution protocol attack and countermeasures

Lu,

Liu,

Chang

et al. 2024

IET Networks

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B5G/6G networks are facing challenges in the deployment of additional base stations. However, Taiwan's four major operators have launched VoWi‐Fi calling services to maintain signal quality and coverage for customers. These services pose potential threats when users connect to untrusted Wi‐Fi networks. Therefore, the authors utilised commercial equipment to study the security of VoWi‐Fi calling services offered by Taiwan's four major telecom companies. The authors employed address resolution protocol attack methods to develop two verification attacks that bypass existing security measures: one for dropping session initiation protocol packets and the other for dropping voice call packets, both capable of circumventing current security defences. Through real‐world experiments, the authors confirmed their feasibility and assessed their potential harm. Consequently, two defence methods are proposed. The first is an anti‐attack algorithm for app and device manufacturers to detect the security of the user's calling environment. The second is a recommendation for telecom operators to implement new detection mechanisms to safeguard user rights.

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Private Header (P-Header) Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for the 3GPP

Cited by 8 publications

References 7 publications

P-Access-Network-Info ABNF Update

P-Access-Network-Info ABNF Update

Updates to Private Header (P-Header) Extension Usage in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Requests and Responses

VoWi‐Fi security threats: Address resolution protocol attack and countermeasures

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