Private Information Revelation in Common-Value Auctions

Mares, Vlad; Harstad, Ronald M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.334360

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Therefore, the seller is allowed to discriminate among bidders in terms of the information which is disclosed. Mares and Harstad (2003) provided conditions under which, in an English common value auction with information asymmetry, the seller will always choose to privately reveal information to some of the less informed bidders, although it may not be beneficial to engage…”

Section: Should Sellers Privately Reveal Information?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Lorentziadis

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

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Section: Should Sellers Privately Reveal Information?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Lorentziadis

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…The problem that how to reveal rival's private information has been studied by many economists. Maresa & Harstad [3] discussed the probability that vendee reveal the information to one or more tenderers in private. This information can help to assess bargainer's asset but it was possessed by vendee in auction.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying Influence Diagrams to Infer Rival's Private Information

Zhou¹,

Yang²,

Chen³

et al. 2010

AISS

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It is important for having the initiative in competition to infer the rival's private information accurately. In this paper, the rival's decision making model is described by influence diagram. According to the criterion that rival is apt to gain the global maximum expected utility rather than to gain the local maximum expected utility, we infer rival's private information about cost, bankroll, tactic, and utility by combining decision computation and Bayesian network illation. The experiment results show that our proposed method is feasible.

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“…Vlad Maresa and Ronald M. Harstad [4] discussed the probability which vendee reveal the information to one or more tenderers in private. This information can help to assess bargainer's asset but it was possessed by vendee in auction.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior Observation-Based Rival's Private Information Inferring

Zhou

Liu

et al. 2008

2008 Fourth International Conference on Networked Computing and Advanced Information Management

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It is important for having the initiative in competition to infer the rival's private information accurately. In this paper, the rival's decision-making model is described by influence diagrams. According to the criterion that rival is apt to gain the maximum expected utility in whole multi-steps decision rather than gain the maximum expected utility just in each of the decision steps, we infer rival's private information about cost and bankroll through observing rival's decision behaviors and using the Genetic Algorithm (GA). The experiment results show that our proposed method is both accurate and reasonable.

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Private Information Revelation in Common-Value Auctions

Cited by 9 publications

References 20 publications

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

Applying Influence Diagrams to Infer Rival's Private Information

Behavior Observation-Based Rival's Private Information Inferring

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