2005
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-5882-5
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Privatization in Latin America

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Cited by 23 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Opportunism is most likely to affect long-term investments when politicians: (i) enjoy strong executive powers that can easily overcome checks and balances (legislature, judiciary, or civil service and regulatory agencies); (ii) have short time horizons due to electoral cycles; and (iii) face low indirect institutional costs in reneging on contractual obligations (Spiller and Tommasi, 2007). Not surprisingly, then, given the prevalence of constitutions and historical traditions that favor strong executives, electoral cycles that typically do not exceed four years, and weakly institutionalized polities, extensive instances of company opportunism and of opportunistic manipulation of SOEs had already been documented throughout Latin America even before the wave of privatizations of the 1990s (Chong & López de Silanes, 2005;Savas, 1987;Tanoira, 1987).…”
Section: Defining and Explaining Opportunism: The Role Of Political Imentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Opportunism is most likely to affect long-term investments when politicians: (i) enjoy strong executive powers that can easily overcome checks and balances (legislature, judiciary, or civil service and regulatory agencies); (ii) have short time horizons due to electoral cycles; and (iii) face low indirect institutional costs in reneging on contractual obligations (Spiller and Tommasi, 2007). Not surprisingly, then, given the prevalence of constitutions and historical traditions that favor strong executives, electoral cycles that typically do not exceed four years, and weakly institutionalized polities, extensive instances of company opportunism and of opportunistic manipulation of SOEs had already been documented throughout Latin America even before the wave of privatizations of the 1990s (Chong & López de Silanes, 2005;Savas, 1987;Tanoira, 1987).…”
Section: Defining and Explaining Opportunism: The Role Of Political Imentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In economic policy, the poor performance of SOEs led to significant popular support for state divestiture by the end of the 1980s, a fact that conservative presidents in the region exploited to justify their privatization programs in the early 1990s. The Latin American public honeymoon with state divestiture continued well into 1995, when 75 percent of respondents still supported it (Chong & López de Silanes 2005).…”
Section: Ideology and Public Opinionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Drug Repurposing or Repositioning, abbreviated DR, is the new technological gateway in drug development, accounting for about 30% of FDA-approved medications and vaccines. DR is the process of discovering new drugs or indications, repurposing the existing, or even discontinued, lines of pharmaceuticals [1]. One of the primary goals of health organisations across the globe is to guarantee that new chemical entities for the treatment of diseases of any kind are both safe and harmless while still being efficient [2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%