2017
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2878891
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Proactive Financial Reporting Enforcement: Audit Fee and Financial Reporting Quality Effects

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Under this view, primarily the direct costs of enforcement limit its desirability. Recent papers by Christensen, Liu, and Maffett [] and Florou, Morricone, and Pope [] find support for high costs of enforcement to firms, exploiting a change of the enforcement by the Financial Reporting Review Panel in the United Kingdom. Christensen, Liu, and Maffett [] find that stronger enforcement reduces shareholder wealth.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Under this view, primarily the direct costs of enforcement limit its desirability. Recent papers by Christensen, Liu, and Maffett [] and Florou, Morricone, and Pope [] find support for high costs of enforcement to firms, exploiting a change of the enforcement by the Financial Reporting Review Panel in the United Kingdom. Christensen, Liu, and Maffett [] find that stronger enforcement reduces shareholder wealth.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Christensen, Liu, and Maffett [] find that stronger enforcement reduces shareholder wealth. Florou, Morricone, and Pope [] document that stronger enforcement increases audit effort, risk, and fees, particularly for firms listed on the Alternative Investment Market.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%