Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences

Lennertz, Benjamin

doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1039-7

Cited by 2 publications

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“…This is because it relies on a new sort of bet, a quantificational bet, which can be argued to be less closely linked to the rationality of our credences than ordinary bets. Furthermore, I argue that the existence of quantificational credences leads to a high‐level conclusion about the nature of rational norms in formal epistemology—the falsity of the popular view that all consistency norms on a person's credal state are truths of probability theory (Lennertz 2017b). So, the topic of quantificational credences is another area where commitments in the philosophy of mind—to noncognitivism and to a particular solution to the Frege‐Geach Problem that results from the first commitment—require us to dig in to further epistemological theorizing.…”

Section: Attempted Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology

Lennertz

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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This paper makes explicit the way in which many theorists of the epistemology of uncertainty, or formal epistemologists, are committed to a version of noncognitivism—one about thoughts that something is likely. It does so by drawing an analogy with metaethical noncognitivism. I explore the degree to which the motivations for both views are similar and how both views have to grapple with the Frege‐Geach Problem about complex thoughts. The major upshot of recognizing this noncognitivism is that it presents challenges and opportunities not only in the philosophy of mind and language but also in epistemology itself. I present some examples where attention to the implicit noncognitivism in formal epistemology has affected or should affect epistemological theory. And I suggest that it is likely that further examples of this sort will arise.

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Section: Attempted Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology

Lennertz

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Snoopy is even less likely to possess the ability to have de re thoughts about each object. The lesson is that for Snoopy to think that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him is neither for him to have some ordinary or conditional credence nor for some fact about his ordinary or condi-tional credences to be true (Lennertz 2015). The facts about Snoopy's ordinary and conditional credences don't determine whether or not Snoopy thinks that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him.…”

Section: What Are Quantificational Credences?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This was the case where Snoopy thinks that each human is somewhat likely to adopt him, knows that Sally is a human, and has a credence of 0 strength that Sally will adopt him. Lennertz (2015) is more complex because i incorporated conditional credences. This is to account for the fact that quantificational credences can clash with conditional ones.…”

Section: A Norm On Quantificational Credencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences

Lennertz¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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in this paper i present an argument for a rational norm involving quantificational credences. To support this norm, i prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem. in order to prove the result, i introduce the novel concept of a quantificational bet. i also undertake a discussion of Dutch Book Theorems in general and remark on the similarities and differences between the Dutch Book Theorem for quantificational credences and Dutch Book Theorems for norms on ordinary and conditional credences. Overall, the discussion of the norm on quantificational credences gives us a fuller picture of the normative landscape of credal states. IntroductionThis paper's focus is a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a quantificational credence 1 -the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that each record in Schroeder's collection is 5% likely to be scratched. i prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the epistemic significance of these results. So, my conclusion is that if Dutch Book Theorems do, in general, support norms on credal states, then we have support for the suggested norm on quantificational credences. Providing conditional support for this norm gives us a fuller picture of the normative landscape of credal states.There is another important upshot of my result. it gives us a better picture of the ways in which quantificational credences are similar to and distinct from widely accepted credal attitudes -ordinary and conditional credences. On one hand, featuring in a Dutch Book Theorem is an interesting point in common between quantificational credences and these more standard credal attitudes. On 1. Quantificational credences were first discussed in Lennertz (2015).

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Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology

Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology

A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences

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