Probabilistic Judgements in Deluded and Non-Deluded Subjects

Huq, S.; Garety, Philippa; Hemsley, David R.

doi:10.1080/14640748808402300

Cited by 545 publications

(457 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…For reasons beyond the scope of this paper, I do not think that the maintenance of delusional hypothesis can be given a similar 'rational' account given the tendency of delusional schizophrenics to adopt beliefs on the basis of minimal positive evidence (see e.g. Langdon et al, 2010;Moritz and Woodward, 2005;Colbert and Peters, 2002;Young and Bentall, 1997;Garety et al, 1991;Huq et al, 1988).…”

Section: Passivity Symptoms Explanatory Challenges and Corollary DImentioning

confidence: 97%

Failing to self-ascribe thought and motion: Towards a three-factor account of passivity symptoms in schizophrenia

Gray

2014

Schizophrenia Research

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This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and sharing with colleagues.Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party websites are prohibited. There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split the first factor (1 above) into two factors: how abnormal experience can give rise to a delusional 'proto-hypothesis' and how a 'proto-hypothesis' in consort with normal experiences and background information, can be developed into a delusional hypothesis. In particular I will argue that a schizophrenic is faced with the unusual requirement of having to identify an introspectively accessible thought as one's own, and that this requirement of identification is the central experiential abnormality of thought insertion, auditory verbal hallucination, and alien control (i.e. passivity symptoms). Additionally, I will consider non-experiential factors which are required for the formation of a delusional hypothesis.

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Section: Passivity Symptoms Explanatory Challenges and Corollary DImentioning

confidence: 97%

Failing to self-ascribe thought and motion: Towards a three-factor account of passivity symptoms in schizophrenia

Gray

2014

Schizophrenia Research

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“…In this context, high UE scorers show stronger associative links between the S choice and behavioral states later in the chain, suggesting interesting potential for research into the relationship between schizotypy levels and the strength of associative links between behavioral states and responding. This suggestion, again, may be useful to examine in terms of decision-making as research into delusions have shown that deluded subjects make probabilistic judgments more Timing & Schizotypy -15 quickly, and with less evidence, than non-deluded subjects 53 , but can also be excessive in changing their choices on reasoning tasks 54 .…”

Section: Timing and Schizotypy -14mentioning

confidence: 99%

Altered time-perception performance in individuals with high schizotypy levels

Reed

Randell

2014

Psychiatry Research

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The possibility of altered time-perception in high schizotypy scorers, as postulated through previous differences shown in performance between high and low scorers in schizotypy on schedules of reinforcement with temporal elements, was examined using a series of retrospective timing tasks. Three stimuli ratio manipulations were made across two experiments, and, using an adjusted version of the bisection-point method for data analysis, results showed that high scorers on the unusual experiences subscale of the O-LIFE(B) estimated the mid point of the stimulus range to be at a significantly longer interval than low scorers. This was true when the ratio between the "short" and "long" standard stimuli were 4:1 (Experiment 1), 3:1 and 2:1 (Experiment 2). These findings are consistent with the notion of altered time-perception for high schizotypals.

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“…That is, they tend to draw conclusions based on less evidence than nondelusional participants (e.g., Huq et al, 1988;Garety et al, 1991;Garety et al, 2005;van Dael et al, 2006;Langdon et al, 2010; for a review see Fine et al, 2007). Even though the conclusions reached in the typical jump to conclusions paradigm are not of delusional content, such a mechanism of hasty decision-making can help explain why someone could consider a false belief in the first place (Ziegler et al, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Rodier

Prévost

Renoult

et al. 2011

Psychiatry Research

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Emotional distress and reasoning biases are two factors known to contribute to delusions. As a step towards elucidating mechanisms underlying delusions, the main aim of this study was to evaluate a possible "jumping to new conclusions" reasoning bias in healthy people with delusional ideation and its association with emotions. We surveyed 80 healthy participants, measuring levels of depression, anxiety, cognitive error and delusional ideation. Participants completed two versions of the beads task to evaluate their reasoning style. Results showed that people with delusional ideation reached a conclusion after less information, as expected. Interestingly, they also tended to change their conclusions more often than people without delusional ideation and did so with greater conviction. Depression and cognitive errors were strong predictors of delusional ideation but not of reasoning style. We conclude that delusional ideation in non-psychotic individuals is independently predicted by depressive symptoms and by a high conviction in new conclusions.

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Probabilistic Judgements in Deluded and Non-Deluded Subjects

Cited by 545 publications

References 20 publications

Failing to self-ascribe thought and motion: Towards a three-factor account of passivity symptoms in schizophrenia

Failing to self-ascribe thought and motion: Towards a three-factor account of passivity symptoms in schizophrenia

Altered time-perception performance in individuals with high schizotypy levels

Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

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